A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION AND DISHONESTY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Purpose and Background
Corruption is defined as the: "lack of integrity or honesty (especially susceptibility to bribery); use of a position of trust for dishonest gain". URL: http://wordnet.princeton.edu. This web page is part of a collection of web pages on this website, mmason.freeshell.org, that documents Judicial Misconduct and Abuse by U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham and the extreme measures that his colleagues at the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals will deploy to conceal the egregious conduct of Judge Graham. This page is a part of the series which asserts that there is a "culture of corruption" within the federal judiciary. The core allegations of misconduct and abuse by Judge Graham are listed and documented at mmason.freeshell.org/CoreAllegations.htm. There are scores of other pages and documents on this website and they are all interlinked. This website tells a story from many different angles and perspectives. The web page, mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm, is a placeholder and a pointer, or a central starting point to other pages that demonstrate that the behavior of a judicial miscreant, Judge Donald L. Graham, that is not remedied by any of the current methods of judicial discipline. The current methods of federal judicial discipline are:
Summary of the Core Allegations which were before the Eleventh Circuit in all attempts at appellate review includes, but definitely is not limited to, the following:
This web page attacks the very integrity of the legal system as it specifically calls Judge Donald L. Graham a liar. This page will give specific examples of where Judge Graham has told an outright lie, and/or a told a half-truth. Additionally, to to the extent that Judge Ed Carnes and Judge Frank M. Hull made the following statement, then their integrity is lacking as well.
Mason merely asserts that Judge Graham was not impartial because (1) he allowed many of Mason's motions to languish, and (2) would not let Mason file a § 1981 claim, but did let another plaintiff with similar claims do so. As to the alleged languishing, a review of the district court docket sheet shows that the court ruled upon his motions in a timely manner. Moreover, a review of Mason's complaint and the other plaintiff's complaint reveal that their claims are not similar. Mason's complaint alleges that county entities and employees violated his First Amendment rights, which is actually a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim. The plaintiff to which Mason compares himself, however, brought racial and national origin discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) and § 1981. Both Title VII and § 1981 can be used to bring race discrimination claims.
See Opinion, Case No. 04-11894. It is difficult to understand why Judge Carnes and Judge Hull would make such a statement when they know that the record clearly contradicts their statement. One could reasonably argue that such behavior is not only dishonest, but arrogant and reckless.
Judge Graham lied and intentionally misrepresented the law. Judge Graham told Mason that the law precluded him from asserting claims of intentional discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981 against a state actor, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners. See Docket Entries Nos. 435 and 466. At the very same time, Judge Graham was allowing a plaintiff in another case Fa Nina St. Germain v. Highlands County, Case No. 00-14094] to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. §1981 against the very same state actor, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners. See Summary Judgment, Case No. 00-14094. It might be noted that Ms. St. Germain was represented by counsel, Peter Helwig, Lakeland, FL and Mason was not represented by counsel. Judge Graham does not dispute that he intentionally lied. On December 16, 2004, Docket Entry No. 932, Judge Graham was presented with a letter or request to file a motion stating that he, Judge Graham, had lied, Judge denied the right to file the motion without denying the allegation that he had lied. See Docket Entry No. 931.
On September 27, 2000, Brian Koji, Allen, Norton, Blue, counsel for Defendant Highlands Count, filed a motion to dismiss and claimed the following:
2. Plaintiff's claims under Section 1981 are due to be dismissed as Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy against public entities for violations of Section 1981. Butts v. Volusia County, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19837, 13 Fla. Law W. Fed. C 1003 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2000). Accordingly, counts 8, 19, 21, 23 and 25 are due to be dismissed.
pg 2,5. (Docket No. 342, pgw. 2, 5.)
On November 22, 2000, Judge Graham's Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr. recommended (Docket No. 435, pg. 3 ) that all of Marcellus Mason's claims under 42 U.S.C. §1981 be dismissed because:
(Docket No. 435, pg. 3 )
This order is dated November 22, 2000,
On February 13, 2001, Judge Graham claimed that he did a "de novo" review and fully adopted the Report and Recommendation dismissing all of Marcellus Mason's 42 U.S.C. §1981 claims. See (Docket No. 466).
Fa Nina St. Germain v. Highlands County, Case No. 00-14094
On April 6, 2000, Fa Nina St. Germain files a lawsuit against Highlands County for among other things violations of 42 U.S.C. §1981. See Complaint pages 2, 9, paragraphs 4-5, 34. The Docket for Case No. 00-14094-CV-Graham is online at: mmason.freeshell.org/00-14094/complaint.pdf.
On August 24, 2001, Judge Graham, having already told Marcellus Mason on February 13, 2001 that he could not state a claim against Highlands County for violations 42 U.S.C. §1981, evaluates Ms. St. Germain lawsuit for sufficient facts to support claims under 42 U.S.C. §1981. If Judge Graham really believed the garbage he fed Mason he would have dismissed Ms. St Germain 42 U.S.C. §1981 claims based on the law, but he didn't. The clear difference is due to the fact that Ms. St. Germain was represented by competent counsel and Mason was not.
LYING TO COVER A LIE: Eleventh Circuit Case No. 04-11894
On May 24, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit stated (lie in red):
Mason merely asserts that Judge Graham was not impartial because...(2) would not let Mason file a § 1981 claim, but did let another plaintiff with similar claims do so ...a review of Mason's complaint and the other plaintiff's complaint reveal that their claims are not similar . Mason's complaint alleges that county entities and employees violated his First Amendment rights, which is actually a 42 U .S .C . §1983 claim. The plaintiff to which Mason compares himself, however, brought racial and national origin discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C . § 2000e (Title VII) and § 1981.Case No. 04-11894, Order dtd. 5-24-2002, pgs. 1,2.
This statement, made by Judge Ed Carnes and Judge Frank M. Hull is outrageous and a very offensive and an egregious lie. Both Judge Graham and the Eleventh Circuit know that this assertion is false because Mason's complaint specifically alleges racial discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) and § 1981. See (DE #321, pps. 1, 2, 11; 63-64, 65, ¶¶1, 2, 3, 85, 459-462, 465-466, 473-474), URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/99-14027/ConsolidatedAmendedComplaint.doc. Mason's lawsuit expressly states the following:
1. This is a civil action against HIGHLANDS, HEARTLAND, HARDEE, and OKEECHOBEE, for willfully violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil rights Act of 1991; violation of Florida Statutes §760.120, as amended in 1992 and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This action is brought under §2.01 of the Florida Statutes. This action is also brought under 42 U.S.C §§1981,1983,1985, and 1986.
It is hard to imagine that judges would outright lie when they know the record clearly contradicts their statements. Aren't Judges required under the law to tell the truth? What is the punishment for judges that intentionally lie and misrepresent the truth?
It would seem that Judge Graham's colleagues at the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, are willing to tell multiple lies in order to keep from disciplining him. Consider the following:
2004, the Eleventh circuit, Judges Carnes and Hull , Case No. 04-11894,
were willing to lie or intentionally misstate the facts in order to cover
for Judge Graham. Proof?
Mason merely asserts that Judge Graham was not impartial because (1) he allowed many of Mason's motions to languish...As to the alleged languishing, a review of the district court docket sheet shows that the court ruled upon his motions in a timely manner .
See pgs. 2, 3 Case No. 04-11894 Opinion.
This statement is false, dishonest, absurd, and insulting. Here again, the Eleventh Circuit chooses to lie again. Judge Graham NEVER ruled on a motion for a preliminary injunction. How is NEVER ruling on scores of motions and filings ruling "upon his motions in a timely manner"? Judge Graham allowed a motion for a preliminary injunction to languish without a ruling, (D.E. 39), from November 24, 1999 until the case was closed on June 20, 2001. Additionally, Judge Graham allowed scores of other motions to go undecided as well for months. See Languishing Motions. Review the docket and see where Graham never ruled on the motions and filings listed in Languishing Motions. See Docket and decide for yourself.
Even Judge Edmondson, no friend of Mason, was begrudgingly forced to admit that Judge Graham had a motion for a preliminary injunction pending for more than 15 months, and further that Judge Graham did not include this fact in his Civil Justice Reform Act, CJRA, report for March 2001.
In this complaint, the single (unsupported) allegation that has not already been determined in previous complaints filed by Mr. Mason against Judge Graham is that Judge Graham intentionally falsified his March 31, 2001, Civil Justice Reform Act Report in an attempt to conceal the fact that he had not ruled on one of Mr. Mason's motions for over 15 months. Not withstanding the fact that the motion in question was pending for more than six months, and the fact that the March 31, 2001 report is incorrect, Mr. Mason has not presented any information, evidence or documentation to support his claim to suggest that the omission of this motion on this CJRA report was an intentional attempt by Judge Graham to conceal his failure to rule on the motion.
Marcellus M. Mason, Jr. of Sebring, Fl. filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Highlands County Board of County Commissioners and Heartland Library Cooperative and other governmental entities and individual government employees in February 1999. This case was ultimately assigned Judge Donald L. Graham and Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr., Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch. After protracted litigation, the case was dismissed, not on the merits of the case, but based upon banned and irrelevant out of court communications between Highlands County and Mason. "R&R" (D.E. 766), Order adopting R&R (D.E 791)
In June and July 2000, Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji, Allen, Norton & Blue asked the Magistrate to grant them preliminary injunctions that required Mason to contact them before he could talk to the government defendants. These orders required Mason, a nonlawyer, living in Sebring, FL to contact private attorneys some 90 miles away in Tampa, FL .
These orders were granted on June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000.
Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case. (DE #201)This order is dated June 19, 2000.
Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including any requests for public records. (DE #246).
Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case. (DE #246).This order is dated July 25, 2000.
In addition to obvious First Amendment concerns, these injunctions were issued by Judge Graham's Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr., who is by law not authorized to issue an injunction. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) states: "a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief,..." Despite this statute, Judge Graham has explicitly stated that it is not clear error for a Magistrate to issue a preliminary injunction.
On June 19, 2000, the Honorable Magistrate Judge Frank J. Lynch entered an Order granting Defendants a preliminary injunction in this action. Upon notice that Plaintiff was violating this order, Defendants filed a Renewed Motion For Preliminary Injunction. On July 25, 2000, Magistrate Judge Lynch entered an Order granting Defendants' Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, once again prohibiting Plaintiff from contacting any of the Defendants in this action or their supervisory employees. Magistrate Judge Lynch also ordered that Plaintiff shall only correspond with Defendants' counsel.See Docket Entry No. 407 dated November 2, 2000.
Between June 19, 2000 and September 20, 2001, Mason repeatedly challenged the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, Judge Frank Lynch, Jr., via motions and the like to issue the injunctions described above. Judge Graham and the Magistrate absolutely refused to state where they got the legal authority from to issue these orders. As set out below, the Eleventh Circuit has refused to discuss the validity of these orders either on direct appeal, interlocutory appeal, or mandamus. It would appear that staff attorneys at the Eleventh Circuit are making a mockery of the legal system.
Judge Graham became angered on September 20, 2001 and issued a pre-filing injunction sua sponte, after Mason kept filing motion after motion asking Judge Graham where the Magistrate got the legal authority to issue the injunctions described above. Judge Graham refused to give legal authority each time.
On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua
sponte, or on his motion and without notice to the litigant, Marcellus M.
Mason. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878)
. Page 3, of this document boldly asserts:
During the week of February 5, 2001, Plaintiff knowingly violated this Court’s Orders of June 19, 200 and July 25, 2000. Plaintiff appeared at the office of Fred Carino, Human Resource Director of Highlands County and a supervisory employee of a named defendant in this action, and demanded to view his personnel file. This request was made directly to Mr. Carino’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel.
(D.E. 511, ¶6, PG.3)
On February 13, 2001, Plaintiff appeared at Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation.
D.E. 511, ¶7, PG.3)
On February 14, 2001, Plaintiff returned to Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation. This request was made directly to Mr. Canno’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel.
D.E. 511, ¶8, PG.4)
After reviewing the, records, Mr. Mason penned a note to Mr. Carino stating that he wanted unredacted portions of billing records and if he did not get them he will file a lawsuit by February 16, 2001
D.E. 511, ¶9, PG.4)
Mr. Mason returned to Mr. Carino’s office a second time on February 14, 2001 and knowingly violated this Court’s Orders of June 19, 200 and July 25, 2000. He demanded to view Defendant Highlands County ’s Insurance Document of Coverage, a document that had previously been produced to him. This request was made directly to Mr. Carino’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel. Notwithstanding, the document was produced to him.
D.E. 511, ¶10, PG.4)
During this visit, Plaintiff became loud, aggressive, disruptive, and questioned the need for Mr. Carino’s presence during his review of the document.
D.E. 511, ¶11, PG.4)
Plaintiffs conduct in violation of this Court’s Orders of June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000 require a dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiff’s claims in the above-referenced matter.
D.E. 511, ¶15, PG.5)
Since April 3, 2001 - subsequent to the Court’s March 27th Order - Plaintiff has repeatedly personally contacted supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants about matters related to this case. Specifically, Plaintiff sent e-mail communications directly to supervisory employees of the Defendants, which discussed the “no trespass warnings” that were issued against Plaintiff, Plaintiffs tortious interference claim, as well as Allen, Norton & Blue’s “track record” of litigating appeals (including Eleventh Circuit appeals). (Exhibit 1).
(D.E. 646, ¶10, PG.3)
Clearly, Plaintiffs “no trespass” and tortious interference claims were an integral part of Plaintiffs present litigation, and involve the same set of facts that Plaintiff continues to rely on in pursuing his present claims. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint alleged several causes of action based on the issuance of the “no trespass” warnings against Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff’s “no trespass” claims were ultimately dismissed by the Court (D.E.’s #435; 466), Plaintiff has recently indicated his intent to appeal the Court’s dismissal of all claims in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (Exhibit 2). Consequently, the issuance of the “no trespass” warnings against Plaintiff are still part of this present litigation.
(D.E. 646, ¶11, PG.4)
In addition, Plaintiff’s communications regarding Defendants’ counsel’s Eleventh Circuit “track record” clearly have no relevance to his state court claim(s), and pertain only to his federal litigation.
(D.E. 646, ¶12, PG.4)
All of Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same set of facts and are all related, and he should simply not be allowed to continuously disregard Orders of this Court and blatantly challenge the Court’s authority.
(D.E. 646, ¶13, PG.4)
Plaintiff has demonstrated a blatant disregard and disdain for this Court’s authority, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s statement that “ANYBODY, who supports your position. . . is a racist and is part of the problem. I fear no man!!! This includes white men wearing robes” and “I aint afraid of a white men wearing robes of any color.” (Exhibit 1, e-mails dated 4/03/01 at 10:57 a.m. and 4/06/01 at 8:33 a.m. respectively)
(D.E. 646, ¶14, PG.4)
“Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.” (DE #201).This order is dated June 19, 2000
“Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including any requests for public records.” (DE #246).
“Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.” (DE #246).This order is dated July 25, 2000.
The Eleventh Circuit, US Court of Appeal has had a multiplicity of opportunities to review these orders, but has declined to do so. These orders were reviewable under collateral order doctrine and could have been appealed prior to entry of final judgment because these orders resolved issues independent and easily separable from other claims in the prior pending lawsuit. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Sona Distributors, 847 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1988).
Following is a list of opportunities The Eleventh Circuit has to review these orders: