How to Manufacture a Criminal

Judge Donald Graham, U.S. District Court, Southern District

JUNK LAW PAGE "Unpublished Opinions" that violate clearly established law and are offensive to the "rule of law"	UNDERMINING AN APPEAL RIGHT This page takes a comprehensive look at how the Eleventh Circuit can undermine an appeal right. For example, in a really despicable act, the Eleventh Circuit struck the Appellant's brief ostensibly because it argued an order "beyond the scope of appeal", however the Eleventh Cir. then turned around and used the same order to affirm Judge Graham. Additionally, the 11th Cir. also refused to address whether Judge Graham should have disqualified or not even though full briefed. They don't deny the allegations of misconduct raised against Judge Graham, they simply ignore them.
TRICKERY PAGE Tricks Used by the Eleventh Circuit to Undermine Appeal Rights	JUDGE EDMONDSON MAKES MOCKERY OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS
JUDGE GRAHAM'S LAWSUIT Judge Graham was sued, however the Eleventh Circuit grants him immunity without discussing the legality of what Judge Graham did.	ABUSE OF INHERENT AUTHORITY BY JUDGE DONALD L. GRAHAM
Judge Graham's Blog A quick summary of Judge Donald L. Graham's Lawless and Arrogant Behavior	Refusal to Discuss Appellate Issues Describes how the Eleventh Circuit evades issues on appeal in order to get the desired outcome. The Eleventh Circuit is quite adept at this tactic.
NO RIGHT TO HAVE MOTION DECIDED The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a litigant does not have the right to have his motion decided.	Judge Graham and the Eleventh Circuit Mock the IFP Statutes. Judge Graham denied an in forma pauperis motion for no reason. The Eleventh Circuit held that Judge Graham was correct because the indigent Appellant did not follow Judge Graham's "order" to pay the filing fee. Incredible !!

Related Websites On Judge Donald L. Graham:
This document is part of a series in which gross misconduct by Judge Donald L. Graham and Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr. is documented at http://mmason.freeshell.org, http://donaldlgraham.blogspot.com, and http://geocities.com/mcneilmason. These websites allege and document gross misconduct which would otherwise be incredulous and beyond belief. These websites demonstrate that federal judges will lie to protect themselves and each other and conceal their misconduct through the use of unpublished decisions. Please refer members of the legal community to the websites http://mmason.freeshell.org, http://donaldlgraham.blogspot.com, and http://geocities.com/mcneilmason.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE INFORMATION The information is based upon a sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction.
SUA SPONTE ISSUED PRE-FILING INJUNCTION. Sua sponte issued pre-filing are patently illegal and violative of due process.
MANUFACTURING A CRIMINAL.
GENESIS OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
STARTING A CONTEMPT PROCEDURE IN STEALTH
GRAHAM'S LAWSUIT Judge Graham used AUSA Robert Waters To Blackmail Mason into dropping a Lawsuit against him. This is a serious allegation that needs investigating.
LITIGATION FILED AT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO RESCIND THE "PRE-FILING" INJUNCTION
COURSE OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS.
PRETRIAL MOTIONS FILED This section and other sections below describe wholesale dismissal of constitutional rights. i.e, Mason was denied his Sixth Amendment right to call Judge Graham as a witness.
BENCH TRIAL
LEGAL AND FACTUAL ANALYSIS

THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE GOVERNMENT

In the information filed in this matter, the government alleges the following:

Beginning on or about September 20, 2001, and continuing to on or about November 1, 2002, in Highlands County, Dade county, and elsewhere, in the Southern District of Florida, the defendant ,MARCELLUS M. MASON, Jr., did willfully and knowingly disobey and resist a lawful order of a Court of the United States, that is, the order issued by the Honorable Donald L . Graham , United States District Judge, on September 20, 2001, in the Southern District of Florida, in the case of Marcellus M . Mason v. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners , et al ., Case Numbers :

99-14027-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

99-14042-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

99-14257-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

99-14314-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

00-14116-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH ;

00-14201-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

00-14202-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH ;

01-14 074 -CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

01-14078-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

01-14230-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH ;

01-14240-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

And

01-14310-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH/

by repeatedly filing pleadings, motions, memoranda, and directly contacting other litigants in the above cited cases, after specifically being enjoined from and ordered not to file any such pleadings or contact other litigants by Court Order dated September 20, 2001, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 401(3).

See Information, dated December 3, 2002.

SUA SPONTE ISSUED PRE-FILING INJUNCTION.

On September 20, 2001, while the case was appeal, Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch, Judge Graham rendered a "pre-filing or screening" injunction against me. See (DE #878). "THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte ." Sua Sponte issued pre-filing injunctions have been universally rejected by every appellate court jurisdiction in the United States as being violative of due process, see mmason.freeshell.org/RejectSuaSponte.htm, or do your own research by simply going to GOOGLE or YAHOO and do a search on "sua sponte pre-filing injunction". Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1998) (“district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant sua sponte without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.”)

DUE PROCESS AND LEGAL NULLITY

It is well settled that any order issued in violation of due process is a legal nullity and as such has no legal effect. “A void judgment is from its inception a legal nullity.” Boch Oldsmobile, at 909 F.2d 661. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 217 (1821)(“the constitution, by prohibiting an act, renders it void, if done; otherwise, the prohibition were nugatory. Thus, the warrant is a nullity.”); Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 941 n. 19(11th Cir. 1998) (“something that is null has no legal or binding force.”); Carter, at136 F.3d 1006 (“[a] void judgement is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect.”).“Generally, a judgment is void under Rule 60 (b) (4) “if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. (emphasis added)” E.g., Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260 (11^th Cir. 2001; U.S. v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 662 (1st Cir. 1990; Beller & Keller v. Tyler, 120 F.3d 21, 23 (2nd Cir. 1997; Union Switch & Signal v. Local 610, 900 F.2d 608, 612 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1990); Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Const., Inc. 167 F.3d 861, 867 (4th Cir. 1999); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996) Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 663-4 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 1981)(“a judgment is void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) is if the judgment was entered in violation of due process… Because this notice never was delivered the judgment must be vacated as void.”). “'No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party.” Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 (1907).

MANUFACTURING A CRIMINAL

This Page will illustrate how to go about concocting a criminal contempt complaint. The system is attempting to teach me a lesson that a federal judge is the law, not the written word. If you have any sense of write and wrong, this page will enrage you. The genesis of the criminal contempt information was a civil case, 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. The case, 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch, had been noticed for appeal since June 25, 2001. See 11th Circuit Letter Acknowledging Appeal. On September 20, 2001, while the case was appeal, Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch, Judge Graham rendered a "pre-filing or screening" injunction against me. See (DE #878). "THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte ." Judge Graham opted not to publish this injunction. The prohibitions of this injunction is as follows:

1. Plaintiff Marcellus M . Mason is Permanently enjoined
from filing any additional pleadings in case numbers 99-14027-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14116-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14201-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14202-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14240-CIV-GRAHAM, 01-14074-CIV-GRAHAM, 01-14078-CIV-GRAHAM, and 01-14230-CIV-GRAHAM or from filing any new lawsuit which relates in any way to Plaintiff Marcellus M . Mason's former employment and/or subsequent interactions with Defendants without first receiving permission from the Court, as set forth below . This injunction shall apply equally to any
persons or entities acting at the behest, direction, or instigation, or in concert with Marcellus M . Mason

2. Any request for permission to file a new lawsuit relating to the issues in the above captioned cases and/or Mason's former employment and/or subsequent interactions with Defendants SHALL be in the form of an application filed with the Clerk of Court and addressed to United States District Judge
Donald L . Graham. This application shall consist of a one paragraph explanation of the issues in the proposed lawsuit, shall contain the names of all proposed parties and shall not exceed one page . The application shall not include any proposed pleadings .

3. Any request for permission to file additional pleadings in the above captioned cases already before the Court SHALL be in the form of an application filed with the Clerk of Court and addressed to United States District Judge Donald L . Graham . This application shall consist of a one paragraph explanation of the requested relief in the proposed pleading, and shall not exceed one page . The application shall not include the proposed pleading .

4. Pursuant to this Order, the Court may require a $1000 - $5000 "Rule 11 Bond," to ensure compliance with all Federal and Local Rules during the course of the proposed litigation . Upon
the completion of the lawsuit, if Plaintiff has complied with all Federal and Local Rules as determined by the presided Judge, the bond may be returned at the complete discretion of the presiding
Judge . Imposition of such Bond shall be at the discretion of the presiding Judge .

5. Pursuant to this Order, the Clerk of Court is Directed to accept no new pleadings in the above captioned cases or no new filings as described above save upon the order of the Court and
then only after appropriate application .

6. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order .

See (Docket Entry No.878, Order dated September 20, 2001 ).

Genesis of Criminal Contempt - Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch

I originally filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida bearing Case No.99-14027-CIV-Graham. This case was ultimately assigned to Judge Donald L. Graham. This case has had multiple appeals and petitions for mandamus associated with it. e.g.. Eleventh Circuit Case Nos. , 01-11305, 01-15754-A, 01-13664, 01-11850 ; This case has more than 1000 docket entries on the Pacer System. See Pacer Docket Sheet. The Defendant in this case and all other related cases, the Highlands County Board County Commissioners, is a GOVERNMENT. Highlands County is located Sebring, Florida which is South Central Florida. Judge Graham's office is in Miami, Florida, or approximately 160 miles from where I reside in Sebring, Florida. Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji of Allen, Norton & Blue reside and work in Tampa, Florida, or some 90 miles away from Sebring, Florida. Court papers are filed in Fort Pierce, Florida, or some 75 miles away from Sebring, Florida. This lawsuit alleges discrimination, among other things, under Title VII, the ADA, and violations of §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 against the
Highlands County Board County Commissioners and other government
defendants and/or their agents. On June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000, the
Magistrate Judge, Lynch, issued the following directives:

               “Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants,
               including their supervisory employees and/or the individual
               Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.” (DE #201),
               page 2 of 2 pages.

               “Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including
               any requests for public records.” (DE #246), page 2 of 2 pages.
               “Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants,
               including their supervisory employees and/or the individual
               Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.”   (DE #246),
         page 2 of 2 pages.

See Right to Petition Government below for legal analysis.

I repeatedly and incessantly challenged the jurisdiction of the court with respect to these illegal orders, (DE #201), page 2, (DE #246), page 2 , however, Judge Graham absolutely refused to state where he got the legal authority to issue the orders in question. Judge Graham has NEVER at any time cited legal authority for these patently illegal orders even though there have been relentless requests. See for example, and note that this list is not collectively exhaustive, Case No. 99-14027 see Plaintiff’s motions and responses, (Doc. #200);(Doc. #239); (Doc. #262);(Doc. #264);(Doc. #284);(Doc. #334);(Doc. #509);(Doc. #515);(Doc. #526);(Doc. 554);(Doc. 632, pg. 5);(Doc.#633);(Doc. 652);(Doc. 663); (Doc. 735); (Doc. 736); (Doc. 738); (Doc. 783); (Doc. 787, pgs 2-3); (Doc. 810); (Doc. 812); (Doc. 813); (Doc. 817); (Doc. 829), (Doc. 845);and the court's orders: (DE #201), page 2,(DE#246), page2,; (Doc.#279); (Doc.281); (Doc.#407, pg.2 ); (Doc. #524); (Doc.#528); (Doc.#634);(Doc. 673); (Doc.744); (Doc.745);( Doc. 766);( Doc.791); (Doc.874, pg.2); (Doc.882, pgs. 1-2), ( (DE-890), (DE-928), ( DE-931), and relevant Defendants’ responses and motions, (Doc. 199); (Doc. 231);(Doc. 274);(Doc. 275); (Doc. 348);(Doc. 511);(Doc. 559);(Doc. 639);(Doc. 646);(Doc.690); (Doc. 823);(Doc. 834); (Doc. 838);(Doc. 841); (Doc. 859). In fact, Judge Graham has blatantly flaunted black letter law and the Congress by expressly stating that his Magistrate may issue an injunction in clear violation of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A), which clearly states:

(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief,...

Judge Graham has held that the above are orders are not "clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law." Specifically Judge Donald L. Graham held:

On June 19, 2000, the Honorable Magistrate Judge Frank J. Lynch entered an Order granting Defendants a preliminary Defendants in this action. Upon notice that Plaintiff was injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff from contacting any of violating this order, Defendants filed a Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On July 25, 2000, Magistrate Judge Lynch entered an Order granting Defendants' Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, once again prohibiting Plaintiff from contacting any of the Defendants in this action or their supervisory employees. Magistrate Judge Lynch also ordered that Plaintiff shall only correspond with Defendants' counsel.

Plaintiff then moved to rescind the July 25, 2000 order, however, on August 15, 2000, Magistrate Judge Lynch denied Plaintiff's Motion to Rescind. Plaintiff appeals the August 15, 2000 ruling. After careful review of the file and the pertinent portions
of the record, the Court finds that t4agistrate Judge Lynch's ruling is not clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also Cooper-Houston v. Southern Railway Company, 37 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1994).

See Docket Entry No. 407 dated November 2, 2000.

Judge Graham and his Magistrate, Frank Jr., (Frank Lynch Jr.), decided they had the authority to prohibit me from speaking to my government out of our court unless I had the permission of Allen, Norton, & Blue, a private lawfirm. Judge Graham and his Magistrate, Frank Jr., (Frank Lynch Jr. ) have never stated where they got this authority from. On June 20, 2001, Judge Graham decided to dismiss my lawsuit because he alleged that I communicated with my government, Highlands County Board County Commissioners, without the permission of private for profit attorneys. See (DE #766), page 2, page 3, page 4, and page 5; Pdf format (DE #791), page 2. Pdf format. During the process of the litigation and after the case was closed, I repeatedly asked Judge Graham where he got such legal authority, Judge Graham declined to answer any such inquiry. The case, 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch, was noticed for appeal on June 25, 2001. See 11th Circuit Letter Acknowledging Appeal. This direct appeal was docketed under Case No. 01-13664-A at the Eleventh Circuit. After Judge Graham got tired of being asked to cite legal authority for orders in question, he then decided to issue a "pre-filing" or "screening" injunction on September 20, 2001, or three months after the case was closed. See Injunction above or (DE #878). See above Orders (DE #'s 201, 246).

STARTING A CONTEMPT PROCEDURE IN STEALTH

This matter (criminal contempt complaint) really started on November 22, 2001 in Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham. (DE -884). This document is entitled Notice of Hearing On Conduct Of Parties During Proceedings. Mind you that this case was closed on June 20, 2001, (DE -791) and had been noticed for appeal since June 25, 2001. See 11th Circuit Letter Acknowledging Appeal. There is no mention of any criminal contempt procedure in this notice. You can't come up with any interpretation that would yield such a result. On November 27, 2001, I wrote Judge Graham a letter asking why I need to travel from my home in Sebring, Florida to Miami, Florida, a distance of 160 miles, for a case that was closed. See 11-27-01 to Graham. Mr. Graham declined to tell what me what the nature of this hearing was on a closed case was, but he insisted on rescheduling this hearing anyway. (DE #886). On December 11, 2001, Judge Graham decides to grant me a continuance on this case. I did not ask for a continuance, I only asked to know why I needed to come to a hearing on a closed case. On January 25, 2002, Graham decided to send me a RE-NOTICE OF HEARING. (DE -892). This notice schedules a hearing for Monday, February 2, 2002. This notice makes no mention of any criminal contempt proceedings. I then wrote Graham another letter asking why I need to show up for a hearing on a closed case. See 02-05-02 to Graham. Graham declined to answer this letter. I refused to show up for a hearing on a closed case. On March 22, 2002, Graham sent me an Order to Show Cause. (DE -900). This is the first time a criminal contempt complaint is mentioned. This Order to Show Cause sets a hearing date of April 8, 2002. I attended this hearing and it was not any "show cause" hearing as I was merely assigned a public defender with no effort to allow me to defend myself. The fix was already in. The bottom line is Graham started a criminal contempt proceeding in stealth on November 22, 2001 and only comes clean on March 22, 2002.

GRAHAM'S LAWSUIT AND SECTION 372(c) TIMING

<>In July 2002, I received a call from my attorney, Public Defender, Leon Watts, he told me that Graham would drop the criminal contempt charges if I would drop my lawsuit, Case No. 02-14049-CIV-Moore and Appeal, Eleventh Cir. Case No. 02-13418. See Graham's Lawsuit. On this very same day, I had a conference call with Robert Waters, AUSA, Leon Watts. Mr. Waters told me that Judge Graham would drop contempt charges against me if I agreed to drop my civil lawsuit, Case No. 02-14049-CIV-Moore and Appeal, Eleventh Cir. Case No. 02-13418. I called my attorney, Leon Watts, the following Monday and indicated that I would not drop my lawsuit and appeal. I reported this incident and the following facts to the FBI office in both Miami and Washington, D.C., however both declined to investigate this matter, nor mention why they wouldn't especially since I have offered to take a polygraph at any time. Unperturbed by this matter, I filed another request for a criminal complaint with the FBI office in matter which is still pending.

On July 30, 2001, Mason initiated a lawsuit against Donald L. Graham bearing S.D.Fla. Case No. 01-14224-CIV-Middlebrooks. Contemporaneous with the filing of the lawsuit Mason filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See Graham's Lawsuit.
On January 11, 2002 (six months after the suit was filed), Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks, Graham’s co-worker and colleague, denied Mason’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis in S.D.Fla. Case No. 01-14224-CIV-Middlebrooks. See Graham's Lawsuit.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c) Complaint, #01-0054, was initiated by Mason on or about September 14, 2001.
A Petition for Review #(01-0054) was filed on or about November 13, 2001.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c) Complaint (#01-0068) was initiated by Mason on or about November 22, 2001.
A Petition for Review (#01-0068) was filed on or about December 18, 2001.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c) Complaint #02-0006 was initiated by Mason on or about February 8, 2002.
A Petition for Review (#02-0006) was filed on or about February 23, 2002.
Judge Graham was served with a civil lawsuit, Case No. 02-14049-CIV-Moore, on January 23, 2002. This case is now on appeal bearing Case No. 02-13418. This lawsuit was originally filed in state court, Tenth Judicial Circuit, In and For Highlands County, Florida, Sebring, Florida, however Graham has this lawsuit removed to federal court where a co-worker, colleague, and personal friend [Judge Moore] could try the case. See Graham's Lawsuit.

LITIGATION FILED AT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO RESCIND THE "PRE-FILING" INJUNCTION

Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-15754. On September 29, 2001, A petition for mandamus was filed. See Receipt date time-stamped October 1, 2001. The matter had already been noticed for direct appeal, Case No. 01-13364 on June 25, 2001, but the Eleventh Circuit had not sent out a briefing schedule. The mandamus petition was denied without comment on December 5, 2001 . See 11th Circuit One Page Denial. A motion for rehearing was filed begging the Eleventh Circuit for an explanation denying mandamus, however, the Eleventh Circuit declined to comment again on Jan. 25, 2002. See Order Denying rehearing.

Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664. This direct appeal was filed on June 25, 2001. See 11th Circuit Letter Acknowledging Appeal. Appeal Briefs: First Initial Brief (Stricken), Corrected Initial Brief, Appellees Answer Brief, Reply Brief, Appellant's Motion For Rehearing. As a matter of fact, I argued the injunction of September 20, 2001, (DE-878), and the Eleventh Circuit struck my brief. To make matters worse, in its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit then took this order or injunction, that they struck my brief for and affirmed the district court. While the Eleventh Circuit was perfectly willing to strike my brief for arguing the order of September 20, 2001, DE-878, it was perfectly willing to use that order to affirm the district court. See pgs. 9, n.4; 14; "Opinion". The Eleventh Circuit justifies affirming the dismissal of this case pursuant to Rule 41(b) by referring to an order that was issued after the case was closed and alleged, but not proves, behavior that was alleged to have happened after the case was closed and noticed for appeal. They struck my brief for mentioning this order, DE-878, and then turned around and used it for their own nefarious ends. See UNDERMINING AN APPEAL, below.
I filed a petition for mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit that was docketed on August 30, 2002, Case No. 02-14646-A. On October 7, 2002, which was denied by “the Court”, no signature, on May 1, 2002. Order 02-14646. “This appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant Marcellus Mason's notice of appeal, filed on June 24, 2002, is untimely from the district court's order enjoining him from filing additional pleadings, entered on September 21,2001.”
I filed various pleadings with the Eleventh Circuit to get review of the order in question, however all were denied without any review or comment. Most were killed by denying IFP Status. If I need to I can document this as well. I saved everything because I never felt like I had a chance with the Eleventh Circuit because I heard about the pro se treatment.
I filed Petitions for Mandamus, Certiori, and Motion for Stay with the U.S. Supreme Court, needless to say All were turned down. See Supreme Court Case No. 01-10367, Supreme Court Docket.
I filed a petition for mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit. Case No. 02-11476-A, which was denied by J. Dubina, on May 1, 2002. More accurately, the mandamus petition was not denied but the in forma pauperis motion was denied because “Mason has an adequate alternative remedy on appeal regarding this issue.” Judge Dubina statement is important and intriguing as the reason will become obvious with more reading. A Motion for Rehearing on the denial of in forma pauperis was submitted on May 10, 2002 and promptly denied and unsigned “by the Court” on June 13, 2002. Documents will be posted shortly.
I filed a petition for mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit. Case No. 04-11894,

Course of Contempt Procedings Case No. 02-14020-Moore-Cr

On April 9, 2002, I made an appearance before Magistrate Judge Lynch and was assigned an attorney. Case No. 02-14020-CR-Moore was docketed on May 7, 2002. See Docket.

On or about November 25, 2002. (DE-4 )I filed a Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, Defendant’s Motion For Declaratory Relief, Defendant’s Motion For A Due Process Hearing, And Defendant’s Motion For Publication . To date, the court has taken no action on this motion. Moreover, the U.S. Attorney has not filed a response opposing this motion to dismiss. See Docket.

On or about 11-27-2002, I filed a motion dismissing my attorney, Leon Watts, Assistant Federal Public Defender.

On December 3, 2002 an Information was filed by the U.S. Attorney .

On or about December 2, 2002, I filed a motion to disqualify Judge Moore. No action was taken on this matter until January 30, 2004 when it was summarily denied. (DE-13).

December 3, 2002. An Information was filed by the U.S. Attorney on December 3, 2002. See (DE-6).

On July 30, 2003, this action was placed in suspense, sua sponte, by Judge Moore. See Docket, 9. There was no action taken either by court or the U.S. Attorney until January 30, 2004. Prior to this Mason filed motions requesting a private attorney, Notice of Pending motions, and motion to proceed on the merits.

On January 30, 2004, Judge Moore set this matter for trial on March 1, 2004. On January 30, 2004, Judge Moore set a status conference for February 19, 2004.

On February 2, 2004, Magistrate O’Sullivan held a hearing for Mason’s motion to dismiss counsel and retain private attorney and for arraignment on February 12, 2004. (DE-15). At this hearing, I made clear that I did not want to be represented my present attorney, Federal Public Defender, Mr. Watts. Magistrate O'Sullivan stated that another lawyer would no difference. I then told Magistrate O'Sullivan that I could possibly borrow the money from my brother and pay for legal services. I made it crystal clear that I did not want to be unrepresented in a criminal matter. He then asserted that since the trial was scheduled for March 1, 2004, there wasn't time, but I could file a motion for a continuance with the district judge.

On March 1, 2004, District Judge K. Michael Moore held a pre-trial conference in Miami. At this conference, I stated to Judge Moore that I wanted other counsel because Mr. Watts, Asst. Public Defender had prepared no defense in law or in fact, and moreover his only advice was to plead guilty with no plea bargain. Judge Moore refused to assign me new counsel under the CJA or let try to obtain counsel through private funding.

PRETRIAL MOTIONS FILED

A bench trial was scheduled for March 15, 2004. However, on March 15, 2004, the day of trial several important and dispositive motions were outstanding or pending and NOT resolved. On the day of the trial, Judge Moore only gave a written opinion the motions to dismiss which was distributed to me on the trial date, March 15, 2004. (DE #44). Several other important motions were only addressed and denied orallly, the day of trial, March 15, 2004. The following motions were pending and unresolved the day of the trial:

January 22, 2004. A Motion To Depose Judge Graham was submitted. The Government did not respond to this motion and Judge Moore did not rule on this motion until just minutes before the bench trial on March 15, 2004. Moreover, Judge Moore refused to grant a continuance, and said that I should file an appeal. Additionally, Judge Moore asserted that I should have known that this motion would never have been granted. The Motion to Despose was filed on January 22, 2004 in order to preclude Judge Graham from asserting that he was too busy to attend the contempt trial that he initiated. As a result of Judge Moore's refusal to rule on this motion until the day of the bench trial, I was denied my sixth amendment right to confront Judge Graham. Judge Moore had from January 22, 2004 until March 15, 2004 to rule on this motion, but he declined to do so.

November 25, 2002. Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, Defendant’s Motion For Declaratory Relief, Defendant’s Motion For A Due Process Hearing, And Defendant’s Motion For Publication was submitted on November 25, 2002. (DE-4 ). The Government never filed a response. This motion languished and was not ruled upon until the day of the trial, March 15, 2004. See (DE #44). In fact the case was placed in suspense
March 6, 2004. DEFENDANT’S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS was submitted on March 6, 2004. See Second Motion To Dismiss. This motion is similar to motion to dismiss above, in that argues most of the same issues as March 6, 2004, however it somewhat different given the elapsed time and the impact on the Speedy Trial statutue and the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. This motion was not ruled upon until the day of the trial, March 15, 2004. See (Second Motion to Dismiss). Additionally, it does not discuss my rights under the sixth amendment to a speedy trial, this issue is simply ignored, among othe things. The government only opposed the speedy trial statute issue only, all other issues raised on both motions to dismiss were unaddressed. See Government's Response.
March 15, 2004. The day the bench trial begins. The court rules on some of the pending motions. The court rules on the two motions dismiss. The Court distributes its written opinion on the motions to dismiss. See (DE #44).

BENCH TRIAL
A bench trial was held on March 15, 2004. The Government called no witnesses and I was not allowed to call Judge Graham as a witness. I was also denied a continuance even though dispositive motions and other important motions were decided the day of trial March 15, 2004. I had no chance.

LEGAL DEFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT COMPLAINT

<>The Eleventh Circuit has given the following advice when a litigant believes a law to be incorrect. In Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank Of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit expressly held:

If the order is believed to be incorrect, the remedy generally is to seek a change in the order — usually by a motion to quash — and, if this is denied, then to appeal and, absent a stay, promptly to comply with the order.

<>See also In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Maness v. Meyers, 1975, 419 U.S. 449, 458, 95 S.Ct. 584, 591, 42 L.Ed.2d 574.) . In In Re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted), the Eleventh Circuit held that orders of the court may be disobeyed when:

<> First, if the issuing court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy or personal jurisdiction over the parties to it, its order may be violated with impunity. In such a case, the original order is deemed a nullity, and the accused contemnor cannot be fairly punished for violating nothing at all. Second, the collateral bar rule presupposes that adequate and effective remedies exist for orderly review of the challenged ruling; in the absence of such an opportunity for review, the accused contemnor may challenge the validity of the disobeyed order on appeal from his criminal contempt conviction and escape punishment if that order is deemed invalid. Third, the order must not require an irretrievable surrender of constitutional guarantees. In such a case, the only way to preserve a challenge to the validity of the order and repair the error is to violate the order and contest its validity on appeal from the district court's judgment of criminal contempt. Finally, court orders that are transparently invalid or patently frivolous need not be obeyed. This exception is based, as is the first for jurisdictional defects, on the notion that "the right of the citizen to be free of clearly improper exercises of judicial authority" demands respect.

The Injunction(DE-878) lacks substantial legal Authority.

DUE PROCESS

In a bit of hubris, Judge Graham readily admits that the injunction was issued sua sponte. No where in the entirety of the document is there any reference to notice and opportuntity to respond to this patently illegal injunction prior to its rendering, As a matter of fact, I have been denied the opportunity to fight this injunction AFTER its rendering.

Firstly the order of September 20, 2001, (DE-878) is defective because it failed to give me a due process hearing to fight the false allegations contained with the injunction.   As a matter of fact, the injunction freely admits that it was issued sua sponte. (DE-878, pg. 3).   The law is clear and not debatable under any set of circumstances that a litigant is entitled to due process prior, not subsequent to, any so-called “finding of bad-faith.” “A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees…” Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). This Court’s own cases, and other Courts as well also supports this notion. “This court has explained that ‘[t]he key to unlocking a court's inherent power is a finding of bad faith.’(internal citations omitted)‘[I]nvocation of a court's inherent power requires a finding of bad faith.’ A court should be cautious in exerting its inherent power and ‘must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees. ’Because the court's inherent power is so potent, it should be exercised ‘with restraint and discretion.’" Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001).“In addition, the accused must be given an opportunity to respond, orally or in writing, to the invocation of such sanctions and to justify his actions.” In Re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995).; Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002)(“for the imposition of sanctions to be proper, a court ‘must comply with the mandates of due process….’”); Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998); First Bank Of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21117, *25; 2002 FED App. 0356P (6th Cir. 2002)(“ A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process…”); In Re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2002)(“[A] district court's inherent powers are not infinite… the use of inherent powers must comport with procedural fairness.”). See Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 354(10th Cir. 1989)(litigant “is entitled to notice and an opportunity to oppose the court's order before it is instituted”); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982); Matter Of Hartford Textile Corp., 681 F.2d 895,896 (2nd Cir. 1982); Werner v. State Of Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1448 (10^th Cir. 1994); Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3rd Cir. 1993); Cok v. Family Court Of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1993).

FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT REQUIREMENT
A record of filing frivolous lawsuits is required before a "pre-filing" injunction can be issued. Meritorious lawsuits, no matter how numerous, simply can not be denied. "[T]he number of actions filed is not, by itself, a determinative factor which would legally support the use of this Court's power to regulate plaintiff as a litigant." Carter v. Electron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 990 (S.D. 1977). If meritorious lawsuits can be denied after x number of lawsuits have been filed, then a potential defendant or tortfeasor can engage in illegal behavior with impunity. "[A]ppellants’ apparent "affinity for litigation," standing alone, would not provide sufficient justification to issue an injunction."   Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 408 (1st Cir. 1985). See also Werner v. State Of Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1448 (10th Cir. 1994)("court approves restrictions placed on litigants with a documented lengthy history of vexatious, abusive actions");Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985)("For in fashioning a remedy to stem the flow of frivolous actions, a court must take great care not to unduly impair[] [a litigant's] constitutional right of access to the courts"); Kondrat v. Bvron, 587 F. Supp. 994, 998 (N. D. Ohio 1984)("some courts have granted injunctions barring plaintiffs from filing further actions, but in those cases the plaintiffs had filed an uniquely large number of frivolous cases.").

For the purpose of justifying this injunction Judge counts the following lawsuits as being "filed": (1)Case No. 00-14202, (2)Case No. 00-14201, (3)Case No. 00-14116, (4)Case No. 01-14074, (5)01-14078, See pgs. 1-2, DE-878, URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-878/de878.pdf. Judge Graham states, “Marcellus M. Mason ("Mason") has filed eleven (11)cases and/or counterclaims in this District…” According to your own definition of “filing”, "A complaint is not considered filed until the filing fee is paid." See (DE -10) Case No. 00-14201. See also (DE -10) Case No. 00-14202. No filing fee was paid in either of the above cases because Judge Graham arbitrarily denied me the benefit of the in forma pauperis statutes. In fact, Judge Graham has a long history of arbitrary denials of IFP status. See Eleventh Circuit and Judge Graham make a mockery of the In Forma Pauperis Statutes , URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/ifp.html/ifp.html. Using Judge Graham's own definition there were only 11 minus 5 or 6 lawsuits “filed.” Case No. 00-14240 which Judge Graham also counts was filed by Highlands County, not me. Now Judge Graham has only 5 lawsuits filed. Case No. 01-14230 was filed in state court and removed to the S.D. Fla. by Highlands County after Judge Graham crafted this injunction where they knew the case would be assigned to you. See Notice of Removal, URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/01-14230/NoticeOfRemoval.pdf. Judge Graham now has only four lawsuits that I filed, not the 11 you concocted. See Litigation Summary, URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/LitigationSummary.doc The four remaining lawsuits were consolidated into Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham.

Summary Judgment Motions Pending and Unaddressed
Graham’s so-called “finding of bad-faith” that was predicated upon Mason’s alleged “relentless and vexatious litigation” is probably the most intriguing and biggest joke of all. It is an oxymoron and a paradox to state that Mason filed vexatious litigation when his Court refused to do its lawful job to consider the facts and record evidence. Judge Graham absolutely refused to rule on summary judgment motions that were submitted by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants. (Doc. 507); (Doc. 667); (Doc. 668); (Doc. 706); (Doc. 797);(Doc. 769);(Doc. 770). Mason presented direct evidence of the Defendants retaliatory motive. (Doc. 668);(Doc. 507).

Judge Graham, himself, is the best witness against his own injunction. The Defendants, Highlands County and Heartland Library Cooperative, filed a lawsuit, Case No. 00-14240,
Highlands County which specifically asked for the type injunction that Judge Graham concocted on September 20, 2001 (DE-878) . However, on February 13, 2001 and January 16, 2001, Judge Graham and his Magistrate stated: “While there are other pending cases between these parties, there is nothing near the extent of the litigation which this Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals usually look to for justifying injunctive relief.” See Case No. 00-14240 (DE 27, pg. 3)(DE 33), URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/00-14240/de27.pdf ,   http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/00-14240/de33.pdf. In the period between February 13, 2001 and September 20, 2001, Mason did not file any lawsuit in the S.D. FL.

UNAUTHENTICATED EMAIL
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were violated because Judge Graham used unauthenticated email to justify his injunction. Graham’s so-called "finding of bad-faith" consisted solely of unauthenticated and fabricated email. (Doc. 878, pps. 4,5). Mason filed a motion to strike, (DE #167), which specifically accused the Defendants’ counsel of fabricating email, but the Magistrate Judge overruled Mason’s objections. (DE #174). For more denials of these emails, See also (Doc. 694, Page 3);(Doc. 662, Exhibit b attached thereto, page 2, ¶6). “Under Fed.R.Evid. 901(a), documents must be properly authenticated as a condition precedent to their admissibility ‘by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.’" U.S. v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000). Clearly, Graham was hell bent on doing things his way rather following the rule of law. As if the foregoing was not bad enough, Graham’s Court actually ruled that these unauthenticated emails were actually irrelevant to any claim or defense pending in this matter or any other matter. (Doc. 469). Lastly, the emails upon which this case was dismissed upon were yet again being challenged for relevancy to the district judge via an appeal. (Doc. 694);(Doc.728). The district judge refused to act on these appeals and challenges.

JUDGE GRAHAM LACKED JURISDICTION

On September 20, 2001, When Judge Graham issued the "pre-filing" injunction, Judge Graham should have disqualified himself long before that date. Moreover, since the matter was on appeal, Judge Graham did NOT have jurisdiction of the matter.

Judge Graham should have recused himself

Judge Graham should have recused himself long before he made the order of September 20, 2001, (DE #878). The Eleventh Circuit refused to discuss this matter on appeal. Judge Graham should have disqualifed based upon the following facts:

Allowing a motion for a preliminary injunction for to languish in court for 574 days and not make a ruling. The motion forpreliminary in injunction was initially filed on November 24, 1999. See (DE #39). See PacerReportsDocketEntries99-14027.html. Essentially, Graham gave himself permission not to rule on a motion for injunctive relief. Despite repeated requests, Graham refused to disclose why he wouldn't rule on the motion for a preliminary injunction. As a side matter, when I filed petition for mandamus (Case No. 01-11305) with the Eleventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit simply stated: "His mandamus petition, however, is frivolous because he has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief to compel the district court to rule on his motion for preliminary injunction." See Order Dated April 26, 2001, page1, page 2.

Allowing scores of motions to languish in court for up to 8 months and not taking any action. See Eleventh Circuit Special Docket No.: 01-0054, HTML Format.

Usurping legal authority by telling a non-litigant that he must seek the permission of a private for profit law firm in order to request public records under Florida Law. “Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including any requests for public records.” (DE #246), page 2. See 01-0054, HTML Format.

Lying and intentionally misrepresenting the law. A judge’s honesty and integrity lie at the very heart of that system. See In re Shenberg, 632 So. 2d 42, 47 (Fla. 1992). Donald L. Graham did this by telling me one version of the law and another version of the law to a different Plaintiff. Graham stated in my lawsuit that I could not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against a state actor while at the very same time he allowed a Plaintiff to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the very same state actor. In my lawsuit, Case No. 99-14027-CIV-Graham, Graham's Court stated: "Counts Eight, Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Five deal with §1981 claims. This Court believes that those claims should likewise be dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891(11th Cir. 2000). In Butts, the Eleventh Circuit held that §1983 constituted the exclusive remedy against state actors for violation of rights contained in §1981. The Plaintiff has a valid §1983 count pending concerning his termination of employment. He has two Title VII claims as well as a disparate treatment claim pending. The Plaintiffs response does not give sufficient reason why he is entitled to plead a §1981 claim in light of the Buffs decision. Therefore, this Court is going to recommend to the District Court that Counts Eight, Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Five be dismissed with prejudice." See Page 3, Report and Recommendation, (DE #435), Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4, Page 5, Page 6, Page 7, Page 8, and Page 9. Graham signed this Report and Recommendation. See Order (DE #466), page 2. At the very same time, Graham was saying that I could not state a claim against a state actor under §1981, he was allowing the Plaintiff to state a claim under §1981 against the very same state actor, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, in Case No. 00-14094-CIV-Graham, Fa Nina St. Germain v. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners. Fa Nina St. Germain's §1981 was disposed of on the facts, not the law and not Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891(11th Cir. 2000), in Case No. 00-14094-CIV-Graham. See Pages 2, Order on Summary Judgment, pages Case No. 00-14094, (PDF) (Doc. 58, JPG), pps: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 27. Clearly, Judge Graham either lied to me or Fa Nina St. Germain as he could not have told the truth to the both of us.

DIVESTURE

On September 20, 2001, while the case was appeal, Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch, Judge Graham rendered his "pre-filing or screening" injunction against me. See (DE #878). The case, 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch, had been noticed for appeal since June 25, 2001. See 11th Circuit Letter Acknowledging Appeal. “The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance — it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); Fogade v. ENB Revocable Trust, 263 F.3d 1274, 1286 (11th Cir. 2001). “Once `an appeal is taken, the district court is divested of jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal until the case is remanded to it by the appellate court, or to correct clerical errors under Rule 60(a).” Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams, 263 F.3d 447,454 (5th Cir. 2001).

ULTIMATE WITNESS AND AUTHORITY
Ironically, Judge Moore, who tried Mason for contempt, specifically acknowledged that a district court no longer has jurisdiction when a notice of appeal has been filed. Judge Moore was the judge in charge in Graham's Lawsuit, Case No. 02-14049. In reply to a motion for clarification from Mason, Judge Moore stated that he could not publish a case, could not state why an order is legal, could not publish the exact text of an order, and could not recuse because the case was on appeal and because he lacked “jurisdiction.” See S.D.Fla. Case No. 02-14049, (DE #63). Judge Moore stated:

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification, Publication ,
and Disqualification (DE#62) . The undersigned dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint by Order dated June 10, 2002 . Plaintiff appealed said denial, and the denial is before the Eleventh Circuit for its consideration . Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs motion . It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs Motion (DE#62) be DENIED AS MOOT...

<>BOTH WAYS
<>The Eleventh Circuit has given itself permission to have it both ways. On May 20, 2004 [Eleventh Circuit Case No. No. 04-11894-B], the Eleventh Circuit made the following bold, and unequivocal assertion:

The September 20, 2001 order did not relate to the issue on appeal, but instead enjoined Mason from filing any further pleadings in the district court without permission. Because the order related to collateral issues, the district court had jurisdiction to issue it.

See pg. 4, Opinion, Eleventh Circuit Case No. No. 04-11894-B, URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/04-11894/04-11894.tif. However, on October 16, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit made the following bold and unequivocal statement:

Moreover, despite the closure of the case by the district court, Mason’s continual filing of motions with the court addressing matters previously settled prompted the district court to prohibit Mason from further filings without explicit permission and initiate criminal contempt proceedings. Therefore, the record supports the district court's implicit finding that a sanction less than dismissal of the action with prejudice would have had no effect.

See Opinion_OCR.htm, pgs. 13,14, http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/01-13664/Opinion-OCR.htm. As if this wasn’t bad enough, (going “beyond the scope of appeal”), the Eleventh Circuit struck my brief for arguing this order and then turned around used against me. See attached 01-13664_Order_Striking_Appellant_Brief.pdf, URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/01-13664/01-13664_Order_Striking_Appellant_Brief.pdf ; and Appeal Briefs: First Initial Brief (Stricken), URL: http://www.geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/01-13664/InitialBriefPending.pdf. The Eleventh Circuit admits to these facts: “This Court granted, in part, the appellees’ motion to strike Mason’s brief, holding that the portions of the brief that related to the September 20, 2001 order were beyond the scope of appeal.” See pg. 4, Opinion, Eleventh Circuit Case No. No. 04-11894-B, URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/04-11894/04-11894.tif However, the Eleventh Circuit goes on to make the following insulting and contorted argument: “Mason is entitled to no relief on this issue because he is attempting to relitigate an issue that this Court already has resolved.” What I am relitigating? How I can “relitigate” something that I was not allowed to litigate in the first instance? It appears that Judge Graham and the Eleventh Circuit can have it both ways.

FREE SPEECH LEGAL AUTHORITIES

RIGHT TO PETITION GOVERNMENT
There are several things wrong with the foregoing directives, not the least of which a Magistrate Judge can not issue an injunction or a restraining order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The Magistrate deals with this legal problem by referring to his injunctions as "a pretrial discovery issue and not an
injunction per se." In other words, the Magistrate is saying that he can issue an injunction as long as he does not call it an injunction. In other words the Magistrate can make a mockery of the Congress and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Notwithstanding the fact that a Magistrate can not issue an injunction, the orders, (DE #201), page 2, (DE #246), page 2 are also illegal because I have First Amendment Right to petition the government and speak to the government anytime I feel like it. I don't ever need a private for profit law firm's permission to speak to the government or request Public Records under, Florida Law. The pertinent comments to Rule 4-4.2, R. Regulating Fla. Bar specifically states the following:

Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a lawyer having independent justification for communicating with the other party to a controversy with a government agency with a government officials abut the matter. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter.

"[T]there is nothing that prohibits one party to a litigation from making direct contact with another party to the
same litigation. See e.g., Missouri Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 cmt. (". . . parties to a matter
may communicate directly with each other.). These rules are designed to regulate the conduct of lawyers, and simply do not
apply to the conduct of nonlawyers." E.E.O.C. v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP., 948 F. Supp. 54(E.D.Mo. 1996)