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HOME | DOCUMENTED ACTS OF MISCONDUCT|JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGE GRAHAM |JUDGE GRAHAM OVERRULES THE FIRST AMENDMENT | In Forma Pauperis Mockery| METHODS USED TO UNDERMINE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE | ||
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Purpose of This PostThe purpose of this post is to make the case that the United States Department of Justice, "USDOJ", should indict U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham on criminal charges and allow a jury to decide the dispositive fact issue of "intent". This post will document multiple instances where Judge Graham has demonstrated a complete and utter disregard for the rule of law. At the very least, the Dept. Of Justice should bring an indictment to set the boundary for where a "judicial act" ends and criminal conduct begins. At the bottom, Judge Graham's behavior is "only" arguably criminal which is enough to create a fact situation for a jury should decide. Under the facts described in this post, it is difficult to see how anybody not wearing a robe would not have been indicted and tried. While not the primary purpose of this post, the behavior of the individual judges of the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of appeal is implicated as well. The Eleventh Circuit, with full knowledge of almost every allegation leveled herein, has taken extreme measures to avoid disciplining Judge Graham thereby enabling him by emblazoning an "S" on Judge Graham's chest. It appears that the Eleventh Circuit is composed of mere sycophants for Judge Graham. If Judge Graham is guilty of criminal conduct, then certain members of the Eleventh Circuit are co-conspirators. If Judge Graham and other federal judges were held to same ethical and moral standards as U.S. Army Officers, and there is no reason why they shouldn't be, then Judge Graham and other culpable judges would be court-martialed and others would be forced to resign their seat on the bench or "command".This post will make the case that Judge Graham and others have violated 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 by willfully and deliberately violating Marcellus Mason's civil rights. These statutes are not so infrequently invoked by the DOJ to prosecute police officers who improperly and criminally violate civil rights. The case will be made by documenting the following:
Organization Of This PostThis post is rather large and somewhat time consuming. As this post accuses a Federal Judge, Donald L. Graham, of possible of criminal behavior it must have substantial factual and legal support. This post is divided into legal authority and factual support. This entire post can be read in less than five minutes by simply referring back to this section and following the support for each argument listed below. This post argues that Judge Graham should be criminally indicted because his behavior crossed the line between a "judicial act" and "criminal conduct". This post alleges criminal violations of civil rights and concealing U.S. Government documents. Firstly, under the guise of a "judicial act", Judge Graham committed a "criminal act by violating the civil rights of Marcellus Mason by manufacturing a criminal contempt complaint and conviction out of whole cloth. This allegation is supported by the following facts:
The Legal Authority On Subjects Covered In this Post:
Reasons Why The Dept. Of Justice Should ActGo Top, Organization Of This Post The USDOJ should act to vindicate the rule of law. It should make clear that clearly abusive and lawless acts that lead to improperly jailing individuals simply will not be tolerated. In a world where Hollywood types are seemingly routinely prosecuted for criminal acts because they are not above the law, it is inequitable to allow a rogue judge to commit criminal acts under the guise of "judicial authority". The system does not work when Judges disregard clearly established law. The system is furthered damaged when the appellate courts and its judges contort the law through unpublished decisions to keep from disciplining a colleague and a rogue judge. The Dept. Of Justice should proceed criminally in this matter because Judge Graham's behavior has had a corrupting influence on our system of justice by causing other judges to contort the rule of law to support him. This matter should be handled by the civil service and career prosecutors in the Justice Department.IntroductionGo Top, Organization Of This Post U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham, like John Gotti, is derisively, but factually nevertheless, referred to as "Teflon Don". John Gotti was called the "Teflon Don" because of his amazing ability to escape prosecution for his heinous acts. Similarly, Judge Graham has managed to escape both public scrutiny and sanctions for his acts of misconduct and abusive behavior. Given a choice, and moral priorities, it would be better to allow John Gotti and his minions to go free rather than having Judges like Donald L. Graham sit on the federal bench disregarding the rule of law anytime he sees fit with apparent impunity. Like John Gotti, Judge Graham may even be guilty of criminal behavior. In a country that allows the U.S. Attorney to get convictions on a conspiracy without proving the underlying crime, there is no reason why Department of Justice can not get a criminal indictment on Judge Graham for the behavior documented below and elsewhere .The ABA and Judicial IndependenceGo Top, Organization Of This Post This post posits that the American Bar Association and its zealous efforts to knee jerk reaction to assert the notion of "judicial independence" is a part of the problem and not the solution. Judges should not feel free to engage in reckless and lawless behavior. Lawless behavior and egregious misconduct should have legal consequences for the judge. Egregious "Legal Error" and Judicial MisconductGo Top, Organization Of This Post "A single instance of serious, egregious legal error, particularly one involving the denial to individuals of their basic or fundamental rights, may amount to judicial misconduct. Judicial Ethics, supra, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics at 9; Gerald Stern, Is Judicial Discipline in New York State a Threat to Judicial Independence?, 7 Pace L.Rev. 291, 303 (1987). An example of this is where a judge told the jurors sitting on a criminal case to "go in that room and find the defendant guilty," thereby depriving the defendant of his fundamental right to be tried by a jury. McCullough v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 49 Cal.3d 186, 260 Cal.Rptr. 557, 776 P.2d 259 (1989). Intentionally refusing to follow the law constitutes a legal error made in bad faith and may also be grounds for a finding of judicial misconduct. Judicial Ethics, supra, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics at 9. Finally, a pattern of repeated legal error (although not necessarily the same error) over a period of time can constitute judicial misconduct, regardless of whether the errors were made in bad faith or were egregious in nature." In re Quirk, 705 So.2d 172 (La., 1997). Judge Graham's behavior far exceeds this definition.Authority to Seek An Indictment of Judge GrahamGo Top, Organization Of This Post The United States Department of Justice has made clear that Judge Graham, a U.S. Dist. Judge Graham is not immune from prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242:Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under "color of law" include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within the their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials. It is not necessary that the crime be motivated by animus toward the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin of the victim. See URL: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/242fin.htm. 18 U.S.C. § 241 states: § 241. Conspiracy against rights If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured— 18 U.S.C. § 242 states: Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death. Charging A 18 U.S.C. 242 ViolationGo Top, Organization Of This Post "To prove a defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 242 by acting “under color of law” to deprive another of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,” the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant’s conduct deprived the victim of rights secured or protected by the Constitution or federal law; (2) the defendant acted willfully; and (3) the defendant acted under color of law. United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997." United States Of America v. Picklo, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 18924,*; 190 Fed. Appx. 887;(11th Cir. 2006)." The Supreme Court has held the term “color of law” is to be given the same meaning in the context of criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 81 S. Ct. 473, 482-84 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. for New York, 98 S. Ct.2018, 2022 (1978). Determining whether a defendant acted under color of law involves an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2001). Color of law means “pretense of law,” and it does not necessarily mean under authority of law." Id. A sample indictment of Judge Graham need only assert the following:The Grand Jury in and for the Southern District of Florida, sitting at Miami,FL charges:"To be deprived of liberty "without due process of law" means to be deprived of liberty without authority of the law." Jones v. Board of Police Commissioners, 844 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1988). Judge Graham violated Mason's civil rights by, among other things, having Marcellus Mason incarcerated and placed on probation when he clearly had no legal authority to do so. Judge Graham gave himself permission to conceal documents belonging to the United States Government. Chief Judge Federico A. Moreno Declines to Endorse Judge GrahamGo Top, Organization Of This PostThis website and related sites makes serious allegations that are supported with substantial documentation and citations to legal authority. This post will not vary from that standard; however for the "player haters" who would defend Judge Graham despite the facts, this post will start with the less than "ringing endorsement" of Judge Graham's behavior offered by Judge Graham's colleague and the Chief Judge, Southern District of Florida, Judge Federico A. Moreno. Chief Judge Federico A. Moreno was sent a letter on March 25, 2008 and told of the behavior described below and he declined to endorse Judge Graham's behavior or deny any of the allegations listed below. In a letter dated April 4, 2008, Judge Moreno wrote: I am in receipt of your letter written to me as a Chief Judge of the Southern District of Florida about actions by Judge Donald Graham. In that letter, you also complained about the Chief Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson. As you can understand one district judge cannot review the actions of another district judge. This rule applies to the Chief Judge of the District as well. It is before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta that any complaint as to a ruling made by a District Judge can be made, I assure you that any decision rendered by Judge Graham was made in good faith upon what he perceived to be the law. Judge Graham has an impeccable reputation. However, if you feel that a judge has erred, the appellate judges in Atlanta are the ones who can decide what to do about it. Thank you for writing. This is not a ringing endorsement and is a good indicator of Judge Graham's lawless behavior. Judge Graham Violated Mason's Due Process Rights by Disregarding the Criminal Contempt ProcedureGo Top, Organization Of This Post Judge Graham failed to provide Mason with the notice required under Rule 42(b), Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure. The show cause order rendered by Judge Graham "had nothing to do with the criminal contempt charge" and information. “[A]n alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of the due process clause.” Skinnerv. W. White, 505 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1974)(citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925)). There is a very specific procedure that must be followed prior to any trial on criminal contempt that must be followed. “An indirect criminal contempt action must be instituted pursuant to the notice requirements set forth in Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” See Criminal Resource Manual at 762, United States Department of Justice. “A criminal contempt sanction must be issued in accordance with the procedures set out in Fed.R.Crim.P. 42.” Martinv. Guillot, 875 F.2d 839;53 Ed. Law Rep. 1113 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v.United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 (1947) (“ Rule 42(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.. requires criminal contempt to be prosecuted on notice stating the essential facts constituting the contempt charged.”). Judge Graham was “required to "state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such." This notice must be given by the judge in open court,"or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. Young v. U.S. Ex Rel. Vuitton Et Fils, 481 U. S. 787, 794 (1987); Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162,165 (1965). In Martin, the case was reversed because the following procedures, Rule42(b), were not followed:Id. n.7. On May 7 2002, Judge K. Micheal Moore was assigned to handle the "contempt proceedings only" arising out of the civil case, 99-14027-DLG which was docketed under Criminal Case No. 02-14020. See “Order of Recusal”, (D.E. #1). The Order to Show Cause, Civil Case No. 99-14027, (D.E. #900) is attached to the “Order of Recusal”, (D.E.#1) as “Exhibit A”. This Order to Show Cause, Civil Case No. 99-14027, (D.E. #900), the only "show cause" order ever filed, according to the presiding Judge and the Assistant U. S. Attorney had nothing to do with criminal contempt case and the information filed in this matter. 18 U.S.C. § 401 provides the statutory basis for a criminal contempt complaint and it states:
Beginning on or about September 20, 2001, and continuing to on or about November 1, 2002, in Highlands County, Dade county, and elsewhere, in the Southern District of Florida, the defendant, MARCELLUS M. MASON, Jr., did willfully and knowingly disobey and resist a lawful order of a Court of the United States, that is, the order issued by the Honorable Donald L. Graham, United States District Judge, on September 20, 2001, in the Southern District of Florida, in the case of Marcellus M . Mason v. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, et al., Case Numbers:See Docket Entry No. 6.The show cause order is completely different in that only alleges specific comments about Judge Graham personally that Judge disagrees with. e.g., " In this letter he wrote: 'I came to your 'Court' or now joke, looking for justice '"; See Show Cause Order, pg. 6. "In this letter he wrote: '[j]udge's with egos and thin skins have no right to be in the justice business.' " Id. Thus it is clear the the show cause order and the
information are completely different. In fact, both Judge K. Michael
Moore and the Government denied that a hearing held on April 8, 2002 as
a result of summons or Order to Show Cause,
Civil Case No. 99-14027, (D.E. #900). issued on March 22, 2002 was
the notice required in this matter. In defeating a speedy trial act
violation, the government and AUSA Robert Waters went to great lengths
to separate the hearing and the notice given on April 8, 2002 and the
information filed in December 2002. The Government has stated: Defendant also complains that his speedy trial rights have been violated. He is mistaken. Defendant bases his argument on the premise that he was arraigned or had an initial appearance on April 8, 2002. This was well before the Information in this case was filed (December 2002). In fact, the hearing before Magistrate Judge Frank J. Lynch had nothing to do with this case. See (D.E. #36, pg 3). A careful reading of the transcript of that hearing (Attachment A) reveals it had nothing to do with the case at bar. That hearing was to advise defendant that the Court was considering summary contempt proceedings against him arising out of his civil case. This type of contempt proceeding is separate and distinct from that involved in this case. See (D.E. #36, pg 3).In order to drive home the point that the hearing and summons held April 8, 2002 was not related to the instant case, the government and AUSA Robert Waters asserted: It is clear from the order that caused the April 8 hearing, and the transcript from that hearing, that summary contempt was contemplated, and the required notice was given to the defendant at that hearing and the required warning to desist in the behavior causing the contempt. United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Brannon. 546 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977). As such, this hearing on a summary contempt proceeding had nothing to do with the criminal contempt charge brought months later by Information.See (D.E. #36, pg 4). The Criminal Acts, Part 1Go Top, Organization Of This Post Judge Graham took an order that he knew for certain was totally devoid of both legal and factual support and made it form the basis of a criminal contempt complaint and conviction. This order, a clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, has had the following impact on the life of Marcellus Mason:
On September 20, 2001 Judge Graham rendered a pre-filing injunction, sua sponte, or on his motion without any urging from any party. On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham issued an filing injunction or pre-filing injunction against Marcellus Mason sua sponte. (D.E. #878). This order specifically states: “THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte.” (D.E. #878, pg. 3;). In this same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, Judge Graham makes a so-called "finding of bad faith". “It has become clear to the Court that Mason is proceeding in bad faith.. Such activity is in bad faith and will not be permitted by the Court.” (D.E. #878, pg. 5,6, “Bad Faith” section). This sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction is void and invalid for the following reasons, each of which standing alone is fatal to the validity of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction:
The Pre-Filing Injunction Was Issued For An Unlawful PurposeGo Top, Organization Of This PostThe record and the law clearly establish that the sua sponte issued filing injunction was rendered for an improper purpose. “[B]efore a district court issues a pre-filing injunction against a pro se litigant, it is incumbent on the court to make "substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant's actions… To make such a finding, the district court needs to look at "both the number and content of the filings as indicia" of the frivolousness of the litigant's claims.” De Long, at 912 F.2d 1148. See May vs. Shell Oil Company, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14786, *7 (S.D. Fla. 2000)(“courts have a duty to ensure that frivolous or meritless lawsuits do not interfere with their constitutional function:”)[1]; Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(holding that an injunction’s purpose is to fashion a remedy to stem the flow of frivolous actions);Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989)(“Litigiousness alone will not support an injunction restricting filing activities.”); Ruderer v. United States, 462 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1972) ("affinity for litigation, standing alone, would not provide a sufficient reason for issuing such an injunction.”). Nowhere in the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction does it identify one single lawsuit that Mason filed that was frivolous. As a matter of act, Judge Graham is precluded by law from asserting that D.C. Case No. 99-14027-CV was without merit because Judge Graham refused to rule on pending summary judgments by both Judge Graham Intentionally Misstated Materials FactsGo Top, Organization Of This PostJudge Graham was even willing to lie or at best, tell a half truth to justify this injunction, for example, Judge Graham states: Plaintiff Marcellus M . Mason ( "Mason") has filed eleven (11) cases and/or counterclaims in this District, all against either the Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, the Highland Library Cooperative and/or various board members or employees of the County and Library .(collectively the "Defendants"). Each case relates to his prior employment by Defendants and Defendants' treatment of Mason after his termination. See (DE#878, pg. 3) The record clearly states that Mason only "filed" four lawsuits. These four lawsuits were consolidated into one lawsuit, Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham. See litigation, or Lawsuits Filed. Judge Graham Is Willfully Flaunting The LawGo Top, Organization Of This Post The information in this section is taken directly from another blog post,"Is U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham Willfully Defying The United States Supreme Court?", which offers even more evidence that Judge Graham is deliberately disregarding the law and the United States Supreme Court. The best evidence that Judge Grahams knows that the right of access to the courts is constitutionally protected is Judge Graham’s own writing in the very sua sponte issued prefiling injunction of September 20, 2001. In this order, Teflon Don states:
See pg. 7, Docket No. 878, (D.E. #878). Judge Graham knows that a constitutionally protected right is subject to due process. RODRIGUEZ v US, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) was a case about due process in which Judge Donald L. Graham presided over at the district court level, Case No. 97-1182-CV-DLG. See Findlaw.com, vlex.com. RODRIGUEZ cites Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)(”all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause“). It is crystal clear that Judge Graham knows of the Supreme Court’s definition and affinity for due process. Even more compelling evidence that Judge Graham knew the law is Judge Graham’s own writings. At pages 6 and 7, of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, (DE #878), Judge Graham cites three cases for his nefarious deeds: Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1991); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986)(en banc)); Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991). In Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1991) the court lays out the procedure followed by the trial court or district court prior to issuing a pre-filing injunction. In Copeland, the court noted: “The district court entered an order requiring Copeland to appear and show cause why he should not be sanctioned for this abuse of his access to the court.” It is quite clear that the litigant in Copeland received notice and opportunity to respond prior to the issuance of the pre-filing injunction. Judge BARD TJOFLAT’s dissent in Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986)(en banc)), “The district court, noting the volume and nature of Procup’s previous litigation, issued an order to show cause why an injunction should not issue prohibiting Procup from filing any further pleadings in the district court.” Lastly, in Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991) the court noted that “the district court, sua sponte, issued an order to show cause asking why Cofield should not be sanctioned for his overly litigious behavior.” What better evidence of willfulness than Judge Graham’s own writings! Additionally, as further proof that Teflon Don is willfully flaunting the law is the fact that Judge Graham was presented with a motion specifically requesting a due process hearing with respect to the sua sponte issued prefiling injunction of September 20, 2001 on 23, 2002. See Document 914, pgs. 19-24. At page 1, this motion asserts: “The injunction violated Mason’s well-established due process rights. It is inexcusable that a federal judge would knowingly issue this type of injunction in violation of Mason’s due process rights.” On January 31, 2003, Judge Graham denied the motion and refused to comply with Mason’s due process requests even though Judge Graham was in possession of a motion citing the same cases that are cited on this post.
Document No. 928. It can not be argued that Judge is not intentionally disrespecting the law. The Co-Conspirators and Appellate ReviewGo Top, Organization Of This Post The primary job of the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal is to review orders and judgments of Judge Graham and his colleagues at the United States District Courts in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals has set a Guinness world record for refusing to review this clearly void sua sponte pre-filing injunction that was rendered by “Teflon Don”, U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham on September 20, 2001. The Eleventh Circuit has declined to review this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction for validity no less than eight times. These denials are fully set forth below, "Long History of Refusing to Review the Sua Sponte Issued Pre-filing Injunction" and at: "Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sets Guiness World Record For Refusing to Review Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction" .The denials invoke a kind of creative dishonesty. As a matter of fact, the denials are not consistent and even contradict each other on each successive attempt at appellate review. Even an ardent supporter of the system would have a hard time arguing that there is not a certain amount of dishonesty involved in the matter. The point here is that there has never been any appellate review of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. Yet this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction has been used as a weapon against Marcellus Mason. The Eleventh Circuit has elevated artifice to a level that would make a shister lawyer proud. The coup de grace is the Eleventh Circuit sat idly by while this clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction was used to form the basis of a criminal contempt complaint and conviction. See this outrageous story, “Eleventh Circuit Sits Idly By While A Clearly Void Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction Wreaks Havoc On A Man’s Life“.Circumstantial Evidence and Judge Graham's MotiveGo Top, Organization Of This Post When Judge Graham initiated the criminal contempt procedure on March 22, 2002, he was under siege and inundated with a bevy of Judicial Misconduct Complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c).
The Criminal Acts, Part 2Contempt Abuse And Coercion To Drop Lawsuit Against Judge GrahamGo Top, Organization Of This Post Judge Graham used the contempt process to force mason to drop a lawsuit file against him. In July 2002 , Mason received a call from his attorney, Public Defender, Leon Watts, he told Mason that Graham would drop the criminal contempt charges if Mason would drop his lawsuit, Case No. 02-14049-CIV-Moore and Appeal, Eleventh Cir. Case No. 02-13418, against Judge Graham.On this very same day, Mason had a conference call with Robert Waters, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Leon Watts. Mr. Waters told Mason that Judge Graham would drop contempt charges against Mason if he agreed to drop his civil lawsuit, Case No. 02-14049-CIV-Moore and Appeal, Eleventh Cir. Case No. 02-13418. Mason called his attorney, Leon Watts, the following Monday and indicated that he would not drop my lawsuit and appeal under any set of circumstances. Mason sent two complaints to the FBI to have this matter investigated. Moreover, Mason has offered to swear to this and other matters under oath, and Mason has offered to take a polygraph test to support his allegations. However, the FBI has not even acknowledged receipt of Mason's complaints, less known taken any action. It is improper to use the criminal contempt complaint procedure to force someone to drop a lawsuit against a judge. Additionally, this matter and other related issues were communicated to the U.S. Attorney, S.D. Florida, Marcos Daniel Jiménez, on February 11, 2004. However, Mr. Marcos Daniel Jiménez has taken no action or even acknowledged receiving Mason's complaint. A Judicial Misconduct Complaint was initiated Judge Graham for abusing the contempt process in attempt to force Mason to withdraw his lawsuit against Teflon Don. Judge Graham Concealed United States Court DocumentsGo Top, Organization Of This Post Judge Graham gave himself permission to conceal documents filed with the court that he disagreed with. Court documents addressed to the clerk are property of the United States government and are not the individual papers of any judge, clerk, lawyer, or any other person. Teflon Don has violated 18 U.S.C. § 2071 by improperly concealing or causing to be concealing my filings and submissions to the Southern District of Florida. 18 U.S.C. § 2071 in pertinent part states:(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.In Case No. 01-14310-CIV-Graham, Graham has concealed or caused to be concealed the following documents that I have submitted to the Southern District of Florida:
Haters and the Collateral Bar DoctrineGo Top, Organization Of This Post The haters and defenders will come to Judge Graham's aid by invoking the "collateral bar" doctrine. "[A] party subject to a court order must abide by its terms or face criminal contempt. Even if the order is later declared improper or unconstitutional, it must be followed until vacated or modified. As a general rule, a party may not violate an order and raise the issue of its unconstitutionality collaterally as a defense in the criminal contempt proceeding. Rather, the appropriate method to challenge a court order is to petition to have the order vacated or amended." In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1346 (1st Cir. 1986). The defenders of Judge Graham will find no solace in the collateral bar doctrine for multiple reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, the collateral bar doctrine was never invoked by the government in their persecution/prosecution or the trial court judge before or during the trial. In fact the matter was put before the court by Marcellus Mason, the Defendant, in a motion to dismiss, see (D.E. #4); however the government as represented by AUSA Robert Waters simply ignored this issue. Moreover, Judge K. Michael Moore waited from November 2002, until March 15, 2004, the day of the bench trial, to decide or rather moot the motion to dismiss without even mentioning the collateral bar or any other issue for that matter. See (D.E. #44)(“ Mason also filed Motions to Dismiss and for Declaratory Relief on November 27, 2002 (DE #4). Because they were filed before Mason was formally charged, those motions are denied as moot.”). Secondly, and just as important, the clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction can not form the basis of a contempt complaint. “A void judgment is from its inception a legal nullity.” Boch Oldsmobile, 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990). Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 941 n. 19(11th Cir. 1998) (“something that is null has no legal or binding force.”); Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998)(“[a] void judgement is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect.”). A void order or an order issued violation of due process cannot form the basis of a criminal contempt complaint and conviction. An order issued in violation of due process is null. “Indeed, its [void order] validity may even be subject to attack in a proceeding for contempt, as the collateral bar rule that prevents attack on an erroneous judgment does not insulate void judgments.” Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150 (3rd Cir. 1986). “When an order is clearly invalid, the rationale for the collateral bar rule dissolves because ‘in that instance the court is acting so far in excess of its authority that it has no right to expect compliance and no interest is protected by requiring compliance.’" U.S. v. Mourad, 289 F.3d 174 (1st Cir., 2002). This case is controlled by In re Green, 369 U.S.689, 82 S. Ct. 1114 (1962) where the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a criminal contempt conviction that was based upon a restraining that was issued without notice and opportunity to be heard.Long History of Refusing to Review the Sua Sponte Issued Pre-filing InjunctionGo Top, Organization Of This Post The Eleventh Circuit has refused to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction no less than eight (8) times. The reasons for refusing to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction is different each time. The following cases provided the Eleventh Circuit with the opportunity to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction:
Case No. 01-13664-A, Direct Appeal, Oct. 16, 2002 is particularly offensive because the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s appellate brief because it argued against that the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction that the Eleventh Circuit stated was “beyond the scope of appeal”. However, when the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge Graham in its decision it then used the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction to affirm Judge Graham. See Putrid Dishonesty:Beyond the Scope of Appeal. This appeal, Case No. 01-13664 has been referred to as the “appeal from hell”. See Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell. Lastly, and even more offensive and egregious, the Eleventh Circuit sat idly by while Mason was being railroaded in a kangaroo court for contempt based solely upon this clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction. See Eleventh Circuit Sits Idly By While A Clearly Void Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction Wreaks Havoc On A Man’s Life. Clearly, a decision has been taken that Judge Graham’s career is more important than Mason’s life. WAIVER OF COLLATERAL BAR DOCTRINEGo Top, Organization Of This Post Any reliance upon the collateral bar applicability has been waived. The government hasnever raised this issue despite having multiple opportunities. See (D.E. 36), “Government's Response To Defendant's Motions To Dismiss Information”; (D.E. #107), “Government's Response To Defendant's Motion To Vacate Criminal Contempt Conviction (D.E. # 106)”; (D.E. #137), “Government’s Response In Opposition Defendant’s MotionTo Vacate (DE 134)”. This Court improperly raised the collateral bar sua sponte for very time in response to a post conviction motion. See R&R, (D.E. #118, pgs. 5). The Court and the government had ample opportunity to assert the collateral bar during the pendency of the matter, but both made conscious choices not to. Secondly, the collateral bar can not and has not ever been applied where as here, the appellate court repeatedly refused to review the injunction in question for validity. "[T]he collateral bar rule presupposes that adequate and effective remedies exist for orderly review of the challenged ruling; in the absence of such an opportunity for review, the accused contemnor may challenge the validity of the disobeyed order on appeal from his criminal contempt conviction and escape punishment if that order is deemed invalid." In Re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397 ¶16 (11th Cir. 1991). As documented above, the Eleventh Circuit declined to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction on multiple occasions before the information was filed in November 2002. See Long History, above. Supreme Court’s Emphasis on Due ProcessGo Top, Organization Of This Post In a long line of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that impingements of constitutional rights are, without variation, subject to the strictures of “due process” or notice and opportunity to be heard prior to their enactments. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Owen v. City Of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Carey v.Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).Right of Access To Courts is Constitutionally ProtectedGo Top, Organization Of This Post The right of access to the Courts is clear according to the U.S. Supreme Court. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977);M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The Supreme court has stated the right of access to the courts also protected by the First Amendment. BE&K Construction CO. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. 536 U.S. 516 (2001)(”the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government,” and that “[t]he right of access to the courts is … but one aspect of the right of petition.”). California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972)(”The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.“). See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)(recognizing “the fundamental right of access to the courts”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)(”The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights.“). A Finding Of Bad Faith Requires Due ProcessGo Top, Organization Of This Post The Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction Makes A Finding Of Bad
Faith Inconsistent With Due Process. “A court must, of course,
exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must
comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the
requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” (emphasis added)
Chambers v.
Nasco, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). “The court must afford the sanctioned
party due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith
exists and in assessing fees. Case Law On Pre-Filing InjunctionsGo Top, Organization Of This PostUS CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE ROUTINELY REJECTED “SUA SPONTE” PRE-FILING INJUNCTIONS. A long line of United States appellate courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have rejected sua sponte issuances of pre-filing injunctions because they are violations of due process. In Weaver v. Leon County Sch. Bd., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8128 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit held that a litigant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a restriction was imposed on his ability to challenge an injunction. U.S. v. Powerstein, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14928,*;185 Fed. Appx. 811 (11th Cir. 2006)(litigant entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court imposed the injunctive order ). See Sires v. Fair, 107 F.3d 1;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2173 (1st Cir. 1997); Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island , 985 F.2d 32 (C.A.1 (R.I.), 1993) (vacating a pre-fling injunction issued without notice); MLE Realty Assocs. v. Handler, 192 F.3d 259, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23362 (2nd Cir. 1999) ; Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2000) ; Holton v. Oral Surg. Sing Sing Corr., 24 Fed. Appx. 37; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25151 (2nd Cir. 2001); Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1998) (district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.); Gonzales v. Feiner, 131 Fed. Appx. 373, * 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8370, ** (3rd Cir. 2005) ; Wiliams v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group , 148 Fed Appx. 87, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18624 (3rd Cir. 2005) ; Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (C.A.3 (Virgin Islands), 1992)(vacating a sua sponte issued injunction); It is imperative that the court afford the litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuing such an injunction. In Re Head, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8265,*;174 Fed. Appx. 167 (4th Cir. 2006)(vacated a 10 yr. old sua sponte injunction); Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 819 (4th Cir. 2004)(vacating a pre-filing injunction issued without notice); Tucker v. Drew, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11784 (4 th Cir. 1994) ;DOUGLAS BAUM v. BLUE MOON VENTURES, LLC , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 91,*;513 F.3d 181;49 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 68 (5th Cir. 2008)(”Notice and a hearing are required if the district court sua sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction or sua sponte modifies an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings.”) ;De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.) ; Roscoe v. Hansen, 107 F.3d 880;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4996 (10th Cir. 1997); Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20966,*;500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007)(litigant must be given notice and a chance to be heard before the [injunctive] order is entered.); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351,354 (C.A.10 (Wyo.), 1989)(vacated and holding that the litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is instituted.); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla., 1983)(court issued a show cause order) Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 1985) (held that district court did give adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before issuance of the injunction); Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm., 936 F.2d 512, 514 (11th Cir.1991)(noting that court issued show cause order prior to rendering pre-fling injunction); In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C.Cir.1988)(reversing and holding If a pro se litigant is to be deprived of such a vital constitutional right as access to the courts, he should, at least, be provided with an opportunity to oppose the entry of an order restricting him before it is entered.); Martin v. Circuit Court, 627 So.2d 1298 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 1993)(reversing a pre-filing order and holding that limiting the constitutional right of access to the courts, essential due process safeguards must first be provided); Lawsuits of Carter, In re, 510 S.E.2d 91, 95; 235 Ga.App. 551 (Ga. App., 1998)(reversing a pre-filing injunction because notice or an opportunity not given); Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that injunctions “may not be expanded beyond the meaning of its terms absent notice and an opportunity to be heard.”). Courts have felt that the notice and opportunity to respond was so important that they have reversed district courts even where they thought the pre-filing injunction was otherwise valid. See Oliver, In re, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (C.A.3 (Pa.), 1982); Scott v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage , 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709,*;143 Fed. Appx. 525(4th Cir. 2005); Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987). Orders Issued Inconsistent With Due Process Are VoidGo Top, Organization Of This Post “A void judgment is from its inception a legal nullity.” Boch Oldsmobile, 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990). Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 941 n. 19(11th Cir. 1998) (“something that is null has no legal or binding force.”); Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998)(“[a] void judgement is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect.”). A judgment is void if the rendering court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862. “A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. V. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). “[T]he constitution, by prohibiting an act, renders it void, if done; otherwise, the prohibition were nugatory. Thus, the warrant is a nullity.” Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 217 (1821). “’No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party.” Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 (1907). Generally, a judgment is void under Rule 60 (b) (4) if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. E.g., s Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 662 (1st Cir. 1990);Beller & Keller v. Tyler, 120 F.3d 21, 23 (2nd Cir. 1997); Union Switch & Signal v. Local 610, 900 F.2d 608, 612 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1990); Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Const., Inc. 167 F.3d 861, 867 (4th Cir. 1999)/a>; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996)
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