JUDGE DONALD L. GRAHAM WILL LIE IN A HEARTBEAT IF HE NEEDS TO

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Justice Turned On Its Head
Judge Donald L. Graham is Above the Law!!!
 

 

Judge Donald L. Graham

 

 


TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND

Post Closing Order

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT APPELLATE TIMELINE

BANNED OUT OF COURT DIRECT GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS

 

 

BACKGROUND

Marcellus M. Mason, Jr. of Sebring, Fl. filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against the Highlands County Board of County Commissioners and Heartland Library Cooperative and other governmental entities and individual government employees in February 1999.  The case was originally assigned to then Chief Judge Edward Davis who retired.  On February 20, 1999, Judge Davis allowed Mason to proceed in forma pauperis, "IFP", or to proceed without paying the required filing fee for a lawsuit. Docket Entry No. 3. This case was ultimately assigned to Judge Donald L. Graham and Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr., Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch. After protracted litigation, the case was dismissed, not on the merits of the case, but based upon banned and irrelevant out of court constitutionally protected and legal communications between Highlands County and Mason.  "R&R" (D.E. 766), Order adopting R&R (D.E 791).  See Banned Communications.  
 
In June and July 2000, Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji, Allen, Norton & Blue  asked the Magistrate to grant them preliminary injunctions that required Mason to contact them before he could talk to the government defendants.  These orders required Mason, a nonlawyer, living in Sebring, FL to contact private attorneys some 90 miles away in Tampa, FL . 
 
These orders were granted on June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000 in part stated:   
 

Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants,  including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.”  (DE #201).  This order is dated June 19, 2000,

 

Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including any requests for public records.” (DE #246). “Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.”  (DE #246).  This order is dated July 25, 2000. 

Judge Graham has expressly stated that the issuance of the injunctions by Magistrate Judge Frank Lynch, Jr. was not "clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law. See Docket Entry No. 407. However, Congress and the law disagree as the law expressly states that: "Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary— a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief...,"  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).  

On March 2, 2001, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners attorneys, Allen, Norton & Blue, filed a "DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW".  See Docket Entry No. 511.  This motion sought dismissal of the lawsuit due to alleged out of court communications with the Highlands County Government in violation the injunctions mentioned above, (DE #201) and (DE #246).  On April 9, 2001, the Defendants' filed a second motion for sanctions in the form of dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit for more alleged out of court communications between Mason and the Highlands County Government.  See Docket Entry No. 646. On May 31, 2001, the Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr., prepared a Report and Recommendation, "R&R", recommending that the lawsuit be dismissed because of these out of court communications between Mason and his local government, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners.  Judge Graham accepted this R&R in whole with no changes or comments. 

The Case was closed on June 20, 2001. Docket Entry No. 791.  A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 25, 2001.  (Docket Entry 795).  District Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham was assigned Eleventh Circuit Case No.  01-13664.  Consequently, the court never reached the merits of the  lawsuit as there were motions for summary judgments pending when the case was closed.  See Docket Sheet, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 769);(Doc. 770), and the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as well, (Doc. 507); (Doc. 667); (Doc. 668); (Doc. 706); (Doc. 797). 

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham affirmed his authority to prohibit out of communication between Mason his government, Highlands County. ("including continual attempts to directly communicate with the Defendants rather their attorneys, the Court enjoined Mason from any further contact with the Defendants or Defendants'' employees. Mason, however, ignored the Court's order and continued to contact the Defendants."). See pg. 4, (D.E. # 878) .


Post Closing Order

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua sponte, or on his motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason.  See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) .  Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte.   One of the most troubling abuses of power by Judge Graham is his willingness to issue a pre-filing injunction sua sponte, or without notice and opportunity to be heard [due process] prior to rendering the injunction. "Sua sponte, Latin for "of one's own accord," is a legal term that means to act spontaneously without prompting from another party. The term is usually applied to actions by a judge, taken without a prior motion or request from the parties."  URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sua_sponteSua Sponte pre-filing injunctions have been rejected universally by almost every jurisdiction in the United States.  Equally troubling is the fact that the Eleventh Circuit, US Court of Appeal refuses to overrule Judge Graham.  The Eleventh Circuit uses a two pronged attack to deny appellate review.  The Eleventh Circuit simply ignores fee paid petitions for relief, direct appeal or mandamus.  Secondly,  the Eleventh Circuit simply claims that in forma pauperis (filing fee waived) applications, appeal or mandamus, are frivolous, for a different reason each time relief is requested.  The bottom line is that the sua sponte issued pre-filing is effect and the Eleventh Circuit knows this. 

 

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT APPELLATE TIMELINE

  • A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 25, 2001.  (Docket Entry 795).  District Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham was assigned Eleventh Circuit Case No.  01-13664.

  • On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham issues a pre-filing injunction, sua sponte.   See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: "THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte."  This injunction was issued was the appeal was pending and briefs had not been filed.  

  • October 2, 2001, Mason files a Petition for Mandamus with the Eleventh Circuit seeking among other things, to vacate the sua sponte issued pre-fling injunction of September 20, 2001 and that Judge Graham failed to recuse or disqualify due to allegations of misconduct and mismanagement.   The mandamus petition is assigned Case No. 01-15754. Mason files mandamus petition despite pending appeal.  

  • December 5, 2001, the Eleventh denies mandamus petition in a terse, one sentence page opinion.  See Opinion.  The " petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition" is DENIED.”  The direct appeal, Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664, was still pending and no briefs had been filed at this point.

  • December 12, 2001, the Eleventh denies an in forma pauperis and refuses to waive the filing fee for the direct appeal, Case No. 01-13664-A, without providing any facts, the Eleventh Circuit simply asserts in mere conclusory fashion, "appellant has not truthfully provided this Court with information concerning his ability to pay filing and docketing fees."  Order Denying IFP.  

  • January 25, 2002, Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 01-157154, deny motion for clarification and rehearing, and refuse to provide legal or factual basis for denying mandamus petition.  Order Denying Clarification.   

  • On March 6, 2002, Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664, the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s brief for arguing against the September 20, 2001 sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Mason to file all new initial briefs less any mention of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction. The Eleventh Circuit claimed the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction was beyond the scope of appeal”. See Order Striking Appellant's Brief.  

  • On March 25, 2002, 19 days after the Eleventh Circuit, struck Mason’s brief for arguing against the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, Highlands County argued for the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction in their Answer Brief on pages 18 and 19. However, the Eleventh Circuit, while granting Mason’s motion to strike Highlands County brief for arguing for the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, did not make Highlands County file all new answer briefs as they had done Mason. The Eleventh Circuit claimed that it would not consider the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction in its decision See Order Striking Appellees' Brief.  

  • On October 16, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit decided the direct appeal, D.C. Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham, 11th Cir. Case No. 01-13664. Opinion (pdf). In the entirety of the very verbose 14 page (unpublished) opinion, there is no discussion as to why the so-called “discovery orders”,[(D.E. #201); ,[(D.E. #246)] were or were not violative of the First Amendment; however, there is ample discussion about Mason’s so-called violation of these “discovery orders.”  The Eleventh Circuit ignores the issue of whether or not Judge Graham should have disqualified even though it admitted it had been fully briefed on the issue.   See Disqualification Issue.   Additionally, the Eleventh does not mention the record acts of judicial misconduct and abuse that were cited to support to support the issue of disqualification.  Lastly, and even more egregious, the Eleventh Circuit uses the sua sponte issued pre-fling injunction of September 20, 2001 that it said it was “beyond the scope of appeal” and promised not consider to justify a Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. that occurred on June 20, 2001.  See "Implicit finding Beyond the Scope.", pgs. 13, 14, Opinion.  

 

BANNED, OUT OF COURT DIRECT GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS

 

 

During the week of February 5, 2001, Plaintiff knowingly violated this Court’s Orders of June 19, 200 and July 25, 2000. Plaintiff appeared at the office of Fred Carino, Human Resource Director of Highlands County and a supervisory employee of a named defendant in this action, and demanded to view his personnel file. This request was made directly to Mr. Carino’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel.

 

(D.E. 511, ¶6, PG.3)

 

On February 13, 2001, Plaintiff appeared at Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation.

D.E. 511, ¶7, PG.3)

 

On February 14, 2001, Plaintiff returned to Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation. This request was made directly to Mr. Canno’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel.

D.E. 511, ¶8, PG.4)

 

After reviewing the, records, Mr. Mason penned a note to Mr. Carino stating that he wanted unredacted portions of billing records and if he did not get them he will file a lawsuit by February 16, 2001

D.E. 511, ¶9, PG.4)

 

Mr. Mason returned to Mr. Carino’s office a second time on February 14, 2001 and knowingly violated this Court’s Orders of June 19, 200 and July 25, 2000. He demanded to view Defendant Highlands County ’s Insurance Document of Coverage, a document that had previously been produced to him. This request was made directly to Mr. Carino’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel. Notwithstanding, the document was produced to him.

D.E. 511, ¶10, PG.4)

 

During this visit, Plaintiff became loud, aggressive, disruptive, and questioned the need for Mr. Carino’s presence during his review of the document.

D.E. 511, ¶11, PG.4)

 

Plaintiffs conduct in violation of this Court’s Orders of June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000 require a dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiff’s claims in the above-referenced matter.

D.E. 511, ¶15, PG.5)

 

Since April 3, 2001 - subsequent to the Court’s March 27th Order - Plaintiff has repeatedly personally contacted supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants about matters related to this case. Specifically, Plaintiff sent e-mail communications directly to supervisory employees of the Defendants, which discussed the “no trespass warnings” that were issued against Plaintiff, Plaintiffs tortious interference claim, as well as Allen, Norton & Blue’s “track record” of litigating appeals (including Eleventh Circuit appeals). (Exhibit 1).

 

(D.E. 646, ¶10, PG.3)

 

Clearly, Plaintiffs “no trespass” and tortious interference claims were an integral part of Plaintiffs present litigation, and involve the same set of facts that Plaintiff continues to rely on in pursuing his present claims. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint alleged several causes of action based on the issuance of the “no trespass” warnings against Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff’s “no trespass” claims were ultimately dismissed by the Court (D.E.’s #435; 466), Plaintiff has recently indicated his intent to appeal the Court’s dismissal of all claims in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (Exhibit 2). Consequently, the issuance of the “no trespass” warnings against Plaintiff are still part of this present litigation.

(D.E. 646, ¶11, PG.4)

 

In addition, Plaintiff’s communications regarding Defendants’ counsel’s Eleventh Circuit “track record” clearly have no relevance to his state court claim(s), and pertain only to his federal litigation.

(D.E. 646, ¶12, PG.4)

 

 

All of Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same set of facts and are all related, and he should simply not be allowed to continuously disregard Orders of this Court and blatantly challenge the Court’s authority.

(D.E. 646, ¶13, PG.4)

 

Plaintiff has demonstrated a blatant disregard and disdain for this Court’s authority, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s statement that “ANYBODY, who supports your position. . . is a racist and is part of the problem. I fear no man!!! This includes white men wearing robes” and “I aint afraid of a white men wearing robes of any color.” (Exhibit 1, e-mails dated 4/03/01 at 10:57 a.m. and 4/06/01 at 8:33 a.m. respectively)

(D.E. 646, ¶14, PG.4)