OVERVIEW: Plaintiff was a pro se litigant with a vast history of filing baseless lawsuits in the court against individuals, government agencies and their officials, Native American tribes, and entertainment firms, to name a few. Another judge of the court had previously characterized plaintiff's complaints as fraught with contradictory statements, indeterminable accusations, and unbelievable assertions. The court believed plaintiff's current action to be of similar character. The court discussed its options in preventing plaintiff from filing further baseless lawsuits, recognizing its duty not to impose too severe a sanction under the circumstances to prevent an appellate finding that plaintiff had been denied his constitutional right of access to the courts. The court determined that a financial disincentive was appropriate for now, but that the sanctions would increase in severity if plaintiff continued to file further baseless lawsuits, resulting eventually in plaintiff's inability to file lawsuits in the court without the court's permission.

OUTCOME: Court dismissed plaintiff's claims and enjoined plaintiff from filing further lawsuits, unless, at time of filing, plaintiff posted $ 1,500 contempt bond, amount derived from plaintiff's payment of $ 150 filing fee for ten baseless lawsuits during year. Court also enjoined plaintiff from filing further frivolous claims under peril of increasing sanctions.

CORE TERMS: affirming, lawsuit, injunction, lack of jurisdiction, res judicata, frivolous, frequent, Eleventh Amendment, failure to state a claim, leave-to-file, meritless, baseless, motion to modify, summary judgment, judicial process, inherent power, filing fee, duplicative, dissented, summarily, abusive, hastily, barring, pauper, posted, expend, deter, duty, federal district, repetitive
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes  Hide Headnotes
Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Baseless Filings 

HN1

All federal courts have the inherent power to protect their dockets from abuse by frequent litigants so long as the measures taken are a reasonable response to the abuse and access to the courts is not entirely foreclosed. Moreover, the courts have a duty to ensure that frivolous or meritless lawsuits do not interfere with their constitutional function. Every paper filed with the clerk of court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of a court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interest of justice. Federal courts have both the inherent power and constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct that impairs their ability to carry out U.S. Const. art. III functions. This duty also extends to protecting federal litigants and their counsel from vexatious litigation.  More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Baseless Filings 

HN2

District courts have considerable discretion in determining how to mitigate the waste of judicial resources caused by individuals who file frequent, meritless actions. That discretion is not without limits, and courts must ensure that some reasonable access to the courts is preserved for every individual. An absolute bar against an individual filing any suit in federal court would be patently unconstitutional.  More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Baseless Filings 

HN3

In the context of a federal court's methods to deal with frequent litigants who file baseless actions, measures that federal courts have employed against frequent litigants include (1) preventing individuals from refiling claims that were previously presented, (2) requiring affidavits certifying that the claims presented were novel, (3) requiring that each new complaint be accompanied by a list of all similar previously filed suits, (4) requiring leave of court to file any pleadings, and (5) limiting the number of filings. This list is intended to be neither exhaustive nor limiting, and there are other suggested measures, such as limiting the number of pages per complaint.  More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Baseless Filings 

HN4

In the context of a federal court's methods to deal with frequent litigants who file baseless actions, a court exercising its equitable powers or its inherent powers should do so in a measured fashion, narrowly tailoring the relief to accomplish its intended goal, and proceeding to more drastic means only if necessary.  More Like This Headnote

COUNSEL: GEORGE MAY, plaintiff, Pro se, Palm Beach Gardens, FL.
 
For SHELL OIL COMPANY, defendant: Karl Joseph Brandes, Holland & Knight, Tampa, FL.
 
For SHELL OIL COMPANY, defendant: Robert Kent Levenson, Holland & Knight, Miami, FL.

JUDGES: Adalberto Jordan, United States District Judge.

OPINIONBY: Adalberto Jordan

OPINION: ORDER

Although I have decided by separate order that this action should be dismissed, I nonetheless have jurisdiction to consider the issue of Mr. May's prolific litigation. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984). This is not Mr. May's first lawsuit. According to the Court's computerized docket records, this is in fact the nineteenth of twenty-one lawsuits Mr. May has filed in this Court since 1996. Three other cases brought by Mr. May are now pending. See May v. Florida, No. 00-2631-CIV-JORDAN; May v. South Florida Water Management District, No. 00-2630-CIV-HIGHSMITH; May v. Huizenga, No. 00-2265-CIV-MORENO. All of the others--including four against the State of Florida and her governor and [*2]  three against the South Florida Water Management District -- have been dismissed. See May v. South Florida Water Management District, No. 00-6191-CIV-JORDAN (July 10, 2000) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); May v. Florida, No. 00-1800-CIV-MORENO (June 29, 2000) (dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds); May v. South Florida Water Management District, No. 00-2023-CIV-MORENO (June 29, 2000) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); May v. Miccosukee Tribe of Florida, 00-1297-CIV-KING (June 9, 2000) (dismissed as duplicative of No. 99-3404-CIV-KING); May v. South Florida Water Management District, No. 00-0519-CIV-JORDAN (May 31, 2000) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); May v. Redstone, No. 99-3231-CIV-HOEVELER (April 20, 2000) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); May v. Cypress, No. 99-3404-CIV-KING (April 5, 2000) (dismissed for failure to effect service); May v. Florida, 00-0003-CIV-JORDAN (March 21, 2000) (dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds); May v. Trump, 99-9095-CIV-RYSKAMP (March 3, 2000) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); May v. Florida, 99-3347-CIV-SEITZ (Feb. 1, 2000) (dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds); May v. Florida, [*3]  99-7623-CIV-DIMITROULEAS (Jan. 20, 2000) (dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds); May v. Glassman, No. 99-8167-CIV-RYSKAMP (May 6, 1999) (dismissed on res judicata grounds); May v. Labarga, No. 98-8963-CIV-RYSKAMP (May 6, 1999) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); May v. Intracorp Entertainment, No. 96-2732-CIV-FERGUSON (Dec. 17, 1997) (dismissed in deference to bankruptcy proceeding); May v. Martin County, No. 97-14215-CIV-ROETTGER (Nov. 24, 1997) (dismissed on res judicata grounds); May v. Martin County, No. 97-14076-CIV-MOORE (April 29, 1997) (dismissed on res judicata grounds); May v. Sun Bank/South Florida, N.A., No. 96-6562-CIV-MOORE (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction) (Jan. 30, 1997); May v. Barnett Bank, No. 96-8044-CIV-HURLEY (Aug. 6, 1996) (dismissed).

These are but the most recent lawsuits that Mr. May has brought in this district. Defendant Shell Oil counts at least 40 lawsuits brought by Mr. May in this district since 1991. See Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 3] at 1 n.1 & Exhibit B (Aug. 17, 2000). Mr. May has also litigated extensively in other federal courts. Those filings have met similar ends. See, e.g., May v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 210 F.3d 384 [*4]  (Table), No. 99-15517, 2000 WL 84389 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2000) (affirming dismissal on res judicata grounds); May v. Disney Enterprises, Inc., 194 F.3d 1317 (Table), No. 99-55252, 1999 WL 731116 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1999) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order); May v. International Game Technology, 178 F.3d 1300 (Table), No. 98-17349, 1999 WL 311203 (May 6, 1999) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim); May v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 176 F.3d 483, No. 98-56210, 1999 WL 282477 (9th Cir. April 15, 1999) (affirming dismissal on res judicata grounds); May v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 176 F.3d 482, No. 98-56212, 1999 WL 282478 (9th Cir. April 15, 1999) (affirming dismissal on res judicata grounds); May v. International Game Technology, 173 F.3d 861 (Table), No. 98-56559, 1999 WL 170850 (9th Cir. March 23, 1999) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim); May v. United States, 173 F.3d 435 (Table), No. 98-5090, 1998 WL 709043 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 1998)  [*5]  (affirming judgment on the pleadings in favor of United States on grounds of failure to state a claim); May v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 156 F.3d 1238 (Table), No. 97-17086, 1998 WL 476509 (9th Cir. July 28, 1998) (affirming dismissal on res judicata grounds); May v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 152 F.3d 927 (Table), No. 97-55820, 1998 WL 418737 (9th Cir. July 20, 1998) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant); May v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 133 F.3d 927, No. 97-16055, 1997 WL 813996 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1998) (affirming dismissal on res judicata grounds); May v. United States, 132 F.3d 50, Nos. 97-5098, 97-5099, 97-5100, 97-5101, 1997 WL 688175 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 1997) (summarily affirming dismissal of four actions and finding that appeal presented no substantial issue); May v. Anheuser Busch-Companies, Inc., 129 F.3d 122, No. 97-2596, 1997 WL 702256 (8th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997) (summarily affirming dismissal); May v. Bennett, 122 F.3d 1072, No. 96-15698, 1997 WL 537502 (9th Cir.  [*6]  Aug. 27, 1997) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendants in seven consolidated actions); May v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 112 F.3d 509, No. 96-2605, 1997 WL 199209 (4th Cir. April 24, 1997) (affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim).

Other judges of this Court have alerted Mr. May to some of the problems common to his many lawsuits. More than three years ago, Judge Moore stated that Mr. May was already "well known to this Court" and "warned that the future filing of frivolous pleadings and motions in this action will result in the imposition of sanctions." Order [D.E. 19] (April 29, 1997), May v. Martin County, No. 97-14076-CIV-MOORE. More recently, Judge Dimitrouleas observed that one of Mr. May's complaints was "fraught with contradictory statements, indeterminable accusations, and unbelievable assertions." Order Granting Motion to Dimiss [D.E. 18] (Jan 20, 2000), May v. Florida, No. 99-7623-CIV-DIMITROULEAS.

^HN1All federal courts have the inherent power to protect their dockets from abuse by frequent litigants so long as the measures taken are a reasonable response to the abuse and access [*7]  to the courts is not entirely foreclosed. See Cofield v. Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n, 936 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991). Moreover, the courts have a duty to ensure that frivolous or meritless lawsuits do not interfere with their constitutional function: "Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interest of justice." In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158, 109 S. Ct. 993 (1993) (barring frequent litigant and pauper from bringing further petitions for extraordinary writs unless filing fee was paid). Accord Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("Federal courts have both the inherent power and constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.") (quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1261). This duty also extends to protecting federal litigants and their counsel from vexatious [*8]  litigation. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1263.

^HN2District courts have "considerable discretion" in determining how to mitigate the waste of judicial resources caused by individuals who file frequent, meritless actions. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. That discretion is not without limits, and courts must ensure that some reasonable access to the courts is preserved for every individual: "An absolute bar against [an individual] filing any suit in federal court would be patently unconstitutional." Id. at 1071. ^HN3In Procup, the Eleventh Circuit listed some measures that federal courts have employed against frequent litigants, including (i) preventing individuals from refiling claims that were previously presented, (ii) requiring affidavits certifying that the claims presented were novel, (iii) requiring that each new complaint be accompanied by a list of all similar previously filed suits, (iv) requiring leave of court to file any pleadings, and (v) limiting the number of filings. See id. at 1072-73. The list was "intended to be neither exhaustive nor limiting," and the Eleventh Circuit suggested other measures,  [*9]  such as limiting the number of pages per complaint. Id. at 1073.

Judges Tjoflat, Johnson, and Tuttle dissented from the Procup majority's holding. Though Judge Tjoflat dissented primarily on procedural grounds, he agreed with Judges Johnson and Tuttle that the possible responses enumerated by the majority should be employed only after other measures have failed: ^HN4"[A] court exercising its equitable powers or its inherent powers should do so in a measured fashion, narrowly tailoring the relief to accomplish its intended goal, and proceeding to more drastic means only if necessary." Procup, 792 F.2d at 1077 n.8 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson noted that he did not object to imposing restrictions on litigants who abuse the judicial process, but counseled caution in light of the constitutional problems potentially posed by unduly limiting access to the courts:

The majority's opinion represents a response to what it perceives as a serious threat to the integrity of the adjudicatory process. We must always be careful as judges not to sound the alarm too hastily. We must be even more careful not to become swept up in our own rhetoric [*10]  and on that account to attack problems with blunt, poorly chosen tools that inflict damage of a constitutional sort far worse than the blight we set out to excise.

 
 Id. at 1081 (Johnson, J, dissenting, joined by Tuttle, J.).

In addition to the theoretical concerns raised by at least some of the measures listed in Procup, the burden that such injunctions place on the courts counsels that they be employed only as a last resort. Interposing an additional layer of process for abusive litigants will require them to expend additional time seeking leave to file, executing an affidavit, or typing a list of previously filed actions. Such individuals, however, typically seem to have plenty of time on their hands. In contrast, those already pressed for time -- judges and court employees -- are forced to expend resources determining whether the litigant has complied with the injunction, which may also require comparing the allegations in a newly filed suit to those in previously filed cases and drawing legal conclusions without the benefit of adversarial briefing. Such determinations would then be subject to appellate review, spawning a further expenditure of effort.  [*11]  See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1388 (11th Cir. 1993). Enforcing such injunctions may require devising custom-made procedural mechanisms that are themselves subject to legal review. See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 229-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding valid procedures created by Second Circuit to screen filings by two litigants subject to "leave-to-file" injunctions and permitting appeal from decision); In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming order denying motion to modify injunction that allowed frequent litigant to litigate only one civil action at a time). Thus, there are pragmatic considerations counseling in favor of not resorting to a "leave-to-file" injunction hastily.

Mr. May's over-litigiousness may well be constrained by measures short of a "leave-to-file" injunction. Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have speculated that financial disincentives may in some cases deter abusive or meritless litigation: "Paupers filing pro se petitions are not subject to the financial considerations -- filing fees and attorney's fees -- that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions.  [*12]  " In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184. Compare In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1262 (finding that resort to broad leave-to-file injunction was appropriate given that defendant was in bankruptcy proceedings and could not be made to pay fees and costs). Following this reasoning, at least two courts have barred frequent litigants from further filings until a bond was posted against which sanctions could be charged. See Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 638 (S.D. Calif. 1998); Washington v. Alaimo, 934 F. Supp. 1395, 1400 (S.D. Ga. 1996). Perhaps this will make a difference to Mr. May.

Accordingly, Mr. May is enjoined from filing any further lawsuits in this Court unless, at the time of filing, he has a $ 1,500 contempt bond posted with the Clerk of the Court. I have set the bond amount at this low level because the only information I have regarding Mr. May's financial situation is that he has initiated ten lawsuits this year and paid the $ 150 filing fee each time. If Mr. May is unable to post this bond, he shall file a motion to modify the amount within twenty days of the date of this order.

Mr. May [*13]  is further enjoined from filing any more frivolous, baseless, or repetitive lawsuits in this or any federal district court. If any of Mr. May's lawsuits is found to be frivolous, baseless, or duplicative, the presiding judge may impose a contempt sanction against Mr. May. If any such sanction is imposed and paid from the bond, Mr. May will not be permitted to file any further lawsuits until he pays the amount of the sanction into the registry, thereby replenishing the bond to the full $ 1,500 amount required by this order.

In addition, Mr. May is warned that if he brings any further frivolous, repetitive, or baseless actions, he may be required to pay the costs and attorney's fees of the parties he sues. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67, 65 L. Ed. 2d 488, 100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980).

Finally, Mr. May shall file a copy of this order together with each complaint he files in any federal district court.

Further abuse of the judicial process by Mr. May will result in the imposition of progressively greater sanctions, including if necessary an injunction barring Mr. May from filing further lawsuits without the Court's permission.

DONE and ORDERED in [*14]  chambers in Miami, Florida, this 30th day of August, 2000.

Adalberto Jordan

United States District Judge