HOME PAGE    Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction  JUNK LAW     FEDERAL MAGISTRATE OVERRULES THE FIRST AMENDMENT | UNDERMINE APPEAL RIGHT AND DISHONESTY | A TALE OF TWO APPEALS, SAME FACTS, DIFFERENT OUTCOME | JUDICIAL DISHONESTY DOCUMENTED| METHODS USED TO CONCEAL JUDGE' GRAHAM'S MISCONDUCT | Justice Turned On Its Head Judge Donald L. Graham Judge Donald L. Graham is Above the Law!!!   UNDER CONSTRUCTION !!!   TABLE OF CONTENTS Paper Tiger HOW YOU SHOULD READ THIS PAGE SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT COMPLAINTS Chief Judge Federico A. Moreno Declines to Endorse Judge Graham JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED LEGAL ERROR Code of Conduct For United States Judges Complaints No. 01-0054 No. 01-0054-Judicial Council No. 01-0068 No. 01-68-Judicial Council INTERVENING MANDAMUS No. 02-0029 COMPLAINTS FILED IN 2005 No. 05-0008 No. 05-0011 No. 05-0012 No. 05-0013 No. 05-0020 No. 05-0021  INTERVENING EVENTS 2005 COMPLAINTS BACKGROUND AND CONCURRENT FACTS APPELATE TIMELINE AND INFORMATION GLOSSARY Code of Conduct for Federal Judges CORE ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT AND JUDICIAL ABUSE       JUDGE EDMONDSON: JUDGE DONALD L. GRAHAM'S ACTS OF MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE, NONFEASANCE DO NOT CONSTITUTE MISCONDUCT  The Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act is a joke and a paper tiger.  Judge Edmondson and his colleagues have not found a forum where they are willing to discuss allegations of misconduct directed at U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham, "Teflon Don", much less remedy them.  Judge R. Lanier Anderson handled the earlier complaints in the same manner as Judge Edmondson. Allegations of misconduct have been raised against Judge Graham on direct appeal, mandamus, 28 U.S.C. § 372 Complaints and 28 U.S.C. § 351.  The allegations of misconduct raised against Judge Graham are never denied, save one exception, they are simply ignored.  In fact what is so pernicious and insidious about Judge Edmondson's handling of complaints under the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act, is that Judge Edmondson knows that the appellate process has not addressed these issues.  In fact, complaints have been lodged against both Judge Birch and Judge Black for failing in their duty to discipline a rogue judge like Judge Donald L. Graham.  HOW YOU SHOULD READ THIS PAGE This website and related website tell a story that is far to incredible to believe, but is true nevertheless.  This Page contains a wealth of information and is difficult to organize.  Having said that, this page is divided into sections that are separated by lines.  Bookmarks are generously applied in order  to make navigating back and forth between sections easy and seamless.  This page starts off with a small summary of allegations of conduct that is considered misconduct in the overwhelming majority of the states.  A more detailed list of allegations along with the binding precedent and mandatory procedures that Judge Graham failed to follow are set forth on a separate page called "Egregious Documented Acts of Judicial Misconduct by Judge Donald L. Graham".  The next section is a "qualified endorsement" of Teflon Don's conduct by Judge Federico A. Moreno that does not deny the allegations of misconduct but attempts to mitigate the conduct. This endorsement lends credibility to the allegations of misconduct.  The next two sections, "JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR" are definitions of misconduct by the states, a federal Circuit Court Judge, Alex Kozinski, and three leading authorities on judicial misconduct.  Compare Judge Graham's conduct to the definitions of misconduct.  The reader should bear in mind that the orders dismissing the complaints rarely state the allegations of misconduct directed at Judge Graham, nor are these allegations denied.  Judge Edmondson and cohorts on the Judicial Council at the Eleventh Circuit simply define misconduct out of existence by using a "negative definition" scam. Appellate Attempts At Addressing Judicial Misconduct In addition to the complaints of misconduct under the act, allegations of misconduct were raised in the appellate process, primarily a direct appeal, Case No. 01-13664-A, and a mandamus petition, Case No. 01-15754.  These matters or cases are fully discussed in two blog posts: Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell Eleventh Circuit Disses The U.S. Supreme Court Chooses To Protect Judge Graham One of the complaints raised against Judge Graham is that he abused the contempt procedure by insisting that a criminal contempt complaint go forward based upon a clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction.  This is an incredible story set forth at mcneilmason.wordpress.com, post entitled "Eleventh Circuit Disses The U.S. Supreme Court Chooses To Protect Judge Graham".  This post documents how the Eleventh Circuit sat idly by while a man was convicted of criminal contempt based upon a clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction.   SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT COMPLAINTS The important here is that the allegations listed here if true would require removal in most states.  Judge J.L. Edmondson does not consider any of the following documented acts of misconduct or abuse subject to 28 U.S.C. § 351, et.,al., formerly 28 U.S.C. § 372(c): Lying and intentionally misrepresenting law. Refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction that had been pending for more than 17 months. Allowing scores of motions and filings to languish without being decided.   Usurping legal authority.  Allowing a Magistrate to issue an injunction prohibiting direct communication with the Highlands County Government.  Additionally, prohibiting  Marcellus Mason from making public records request under Florida Law directly to Highlands County.  Violating clearly established law and the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court by issuing pre-filing injunctions. Abuse of the criminal contempt procedure. Lying and intentionally misrepresenting material facts. Ignoring the U.S. Supreme Court denying access to the courts by refusing to state any reason for denying IFP applications.   The foregoing are referred to in this website as "core allegations of misconduct" and they are fully documented at: mmason.freeshell.org/CoreAllegations.htm.  These allegations are also partially supported, below under Record Support. These allegations easily fit within the definitions of misconduct described in JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR.  Chief Judge Federico A. Moreno Declines to Endorse Judge Graham Chief Judge Federico A. Moreno was sent a letter on March 25, 2008 and told of the behavior described below and declined to endorse Judge Graham's behavior or deny any of the allegations listed below. In a letter dated April 4, 2008, Judge Moreno wrote: I am in receipt of your letter written to me as a Chief Judge of the Southern District of Florida about actions by Judge Donald Graham. In that letter, you also complained about the Chief Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson. As you can understand one district judge cannot review the actions of another district judge. This rule applies to the Chief Judge of the District as well. It is before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta that any complaint as to a ruling made by a District Judge can be made, I assure you that any decision rendered by Judge Graham was made in good faith upon what he perceived to be the law. Judge Graham has an impeccable reputation. However, if you feel that a judge has erred, the appellate judges in Atlanta are the ones who can decide what to do about it. Thank you for writing.   JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED Judicial Misconduct has been defined by Jeffrey M. Shaman, DePaul University Law, Steven Lubet, Professor, Northwestern University Law, James J. Alfini President and Dean, South Texas College of Law, U.S. Judge Alex Kozinski, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in part as: Judicial action taken without any arguable legal basis —and without giving notice and an opportunity to be heard to the party adversely affected—is far worse than simple error or abuse of discretion; it’s an abuse of judicial power that is “prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” See 28 U.S.C. § 351(a); Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, supra, § 2.02, at 37 (“Serious legal error is more likely to amount to misconduct than a minor mistake. See Opinion online at: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/coa/newopinions.nsf/F822E1DE5540855A8825708B0081F154/$file/0389037o.pdf?openelement. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Conference, Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability has stated: [A] judge’s pattern and practice of arbitrarily and deliberately disregarding prevailing legal standards and thereby causing expense and delay to litigants may be misconduct. However, the characterization of such behavior as misconduct is fraught with dangers to judicial independence. Therefore, a cognizable misconduct complaint based on allegations of a judge not following prevailing law or the directions of a court of appeals in particular cases must identify clear and convincing evidence of willfulness, that is, clear and convincing evidence of a judge's arbitrary and intentional departure from prevailing law based on his or her disagreement with, or willful indifference to, that law. http://www.uscourts.gov/library/judicialmisconduct/jcdopinions108.pdf   The Florida Supreme Court has stated that: [C]onduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary may be shown by evidence of an accumulation of small and ostensibly innocuous incidents which, when considered together, emerge as a pattern of hostile conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary. Inquiry Concerning A Judge, NO. 97-376, Re: Steven P. Shea, Florida Supreme Court, March 23, 2003.   "[A] judge is guilty of "oppression in office" when that judge intentionally commits acts which he or she knows, or should know, are obviously and seriously wrong under the circumstances and amount to an excessive use of judicial authority."  State v. Colclazier, 2002 OK JUD 1, 106 P.3d 138.  "Where honesty or integrity are at issue, a single action can result in a finding of judicial misconduct."  In re Hill, 152 Vt. 548, 572-75, 568 A.2d 361, 373-75 (1989);   "Canon 3A(5) is violated where there is a pattern of unreasonable delay or where a particular instance is so lacking in legitimate justification that it is willful. See Matter of Long, 244 Kan. 719, 724, 772 P.2d 814, 818 (1989) (Canon 3A(5) violated where delay is "significant, extensive, and unjustified"); Sommerville, 364 S.E.2d at 23 n.3 (sanctions appropriate under Canon 3A(5) where there is a pattern of delay resulting from either willful neglect of, or manifest inability to effectively perform, judicial duties); Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 97 n.2, 494 A.2d 1014, 1016 n.2 (1985) (delay can violate Canon 3A(5) if "willful" or "typical of the judge's work");"  See URL:http://www.libraries.vermont.gov/SUPCT/157/op90-478.txt. LEGAL ERROR "It has been said that judicial independence encompasses making mistakes and committing error, but does not afford protection to judges who repeatedly ignore the law."  Arizona Supreme Court, Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, ADVISORY OPINION 92-10,(September 1, 1992). Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson and his colleagues at the Eleventh Circuit are of the singular opinion that legal does not constitute misconduct.   “Legal error and judicial misconduct are not mutually exclusive.” In Re Feinberg, 5 NY3d 206,New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.  "A single instance of serious, egregious legal error, particularly one involving the denial to individuals of their basic or fundamental rights, may amount to judicial misconduct."  In re Quirk, 705 So.2d 172 (La., 1997).  "[J]udicial misconduct (including improper ex parte communications) varies in degree from plainly criminal or corrupt misconduct, through injudicious (but not corrupt) misconduct, to misconduct committed for proper motives though pursued by prohibited means."  Larsen, Matter of, 616 A.2d 529, 532 Pa. 326 (Pa., 1992).  An emerging pattern of legal errors even though not an egregious legal error nor bad faith should be labeled misconduct because the continuing pattern of legal error constitutes neglect and ignorance of governing statutes.  Miss. Com'n On Jud. Performance v. Britton, 936 So.2d 898 (Miss., 2006). See also In Re James Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525 (Tex.Rev.Trib., 1998)("legal error by a judge may constitute grounds for a finding of judicial misconduct if the commission of legal error is founded on bad faith.");Goldman v. Nevada Com'n on Judicial Discipline, 830 P.2d 107, 108 Nev. 251 (Nev., 1992)("An experienced trial judge's ignorance of proper contempt procedures, without more, has been held to constitute the bad faith necessary to a finding of willful misconduct." ) The University of New Mexico, Institute of Public Law, Judicial Education Center, has put together a Judicial Ethics Handbook which defines judicial misconduct. If Judge Edmondson had an affirmative definition like the ones described above, then Judge Graham would have to disciplined. If the states are able to cite and list specific examples of judicial misconduct, then there is no reason why the federal judiciary can not do the same. To simply say, no that is not misconduct as Judge Edmondson does reflexively, is not enough. Complaint No. 01-0054 See Complaint and Order,Judicial Council Order. Complaint No. 01-0054 which was filed on or about September 14, 2001 alleges and documents the following acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance : Refusal to rule on a motion to proceed in forma pauperis for more than 6 months (Case No.01-14078). Refusal to rule on a motion to amend that had been for over 7 months, (Case No.00-14240). Allowed his Magistrate to render an injunction profiting direct communication with the government out of court. Allowed his Magistrate to render an injunction prohibiting direct requests to the government for public records under Florida Law. Allowed scores motions to go undecided for months.   Intentionally lied and misrepresented the law. November 7 2001, Judge R. Lanier Anderson renders order dismissing the complaint due to: The allegations of the Complaint are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling" and/or 'Action on the complaint is no longer necessary because of intervening events, and therefore moot". Consequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A) and (3)(B) and Addendum Three Rule 4 (a)(2), this Complaint is DISMISSED.  Compare Judge Anderson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR. NEGATIVE DEFINTION: THE PERFECT SCAM Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson has used  the perfect scam to defeat claims of judicial misconduct under the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. § 351, et.seq. The perfect scam is a "negative definition" of judicial misconduct. A negative definition is a "definition which states what a thing is NOT rather than what it is." http://academic.csuohio.edu/polen/LC9_Help/2/25negative.htm. Judge Edmondson does not define misconduct he simply disagrees with every act that alleges misconduct in the complaint is judicial misconduct. Consequently, a negative definition is used to define judicial misconduct out of existence. Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson's definition, or lack thereof, would suggest that federal judges are held to a lower standard than state court judges. Congress does not help as it chosen not to identify specific acts that it considers to be judicial misconduct for it has abrogated this responsibility and left it up to judges like Judge Edmondson to decide. Section 352 states: (b) Action by Chief Judge Following Review.— After expeditiously reviewing a complaint under subsection (a), the chief judge, by written order stating his or her reasons, may— (1) dismiss the complaint— (A) if the chief judge finds the complaint to be— (i) not in conformity with section 351 (a); (ii) directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling; or (iii) frivolous, lacking sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred, or containing allegations which are incapable of being established through investigation; or     Complaint No. 01-0068 Complaint filed on November 27, 2001 Judge attempted to arrogate his own authority by ordering the clerk to return notices of appeals without filing them. See Complaint and Order, Judicial Council Order. December 14, 2001, Judge R. Lanier Anderson renders order dismissing the complaint due to:   The allegations of the Complaint are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling". Additionally, this complainant currently has pending in this court several Petitions for Writs of Mandamus that address this issue. Consequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c)(3)(A) and Addendum Three Rule 4(a)(2) this Complaint is Dismissed.  Compare Judge Anderson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR.   When Judge Anderson wrote this order the "Petitions for Writs of Mandamus" , Case No. 01-15754,  he refers to had already been denied by the Eleventh Circuit on December 5, 2001.The order denying mandamus is a mere one sentence opinion that does not deny any of the allegations of misconduct or abuse. ("The "petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition" is DENIED.”) Consequently, Judge Anderson knows that Judge Graham's misconduct has not been even discussed, much less remedied.    INTERVENING MANDAMUS December 5, 2001, in a terse one page, (Case No. 01-15754), "opinion" denies relief. "The "petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition" is DENIED."  January 25, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit refuses to give the basis for its opinion of December 5, 2001 and denies a motion for rehearing or clarification. Complaint No. 02-0029 Judge Graham attempted to use the contempt process to force Mason to drop a lawsuit filed against him.    In this Complaint, Mr. Mason makes the unsupported allegation that Judge Graham has "improperly and illegally used his office to bring criminal contempt charges against me since the imitation (sic) of my last complaint on February 8, 2002". Although Mr. Mason does not submit any evidence or documentation in support of his allegation, Judge Graham did in fact issue an Order to Show Cause regarding possible contempt charges against Mr. Mason detailing why Mr. Mason should be charged with criminal contempt, Not one reason cited in this order relates to any complaints having been filed against Judge Graham by Mr. Mason. The allegations that Judge Graham improperly and illegally issued the Order to Show Cause, and that it was issued in retaliation for Mr. Mason having filed complaints against judge Graham are clearly disputed by Mr. Mason's behavior and obvious disregard for Judge Graham's Omnibus Order and are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling", Therefore, pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A) and Addendum III Rule 4(a)(2), this Complaint is Dismissed . See Complaint and Order. Compare Judge Anderson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR. COMPLAINTS FILED IN 2005 A Series of complaints,  Nos. 05-00008, 05-0011,  05-0012, 05-0013, 05-0020, and 05-0021, were filed in 2005.  In order to keep Judge Edmondson from viewing allegations of misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance  against Judge Graham in isolation, Mason included the following allegations in all the complaints so that Judge Graham's record could be viewed in the aggregate.  intentionally lying and misrepresenting the law;  refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction for more than 15 months;  allowing scores of motions to go undecided;  and usurping legal authority. Additionally, in 2005, Judge Edmondson knows for certain that Judge Graham has escaped appellate review because the Eleventh Circuit, though fully briefed, refused to discuss whether Judge Graham should have disqualified.  Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit declined to discuss the allegations of misconduct and abuse that Mason used to support the thesis that Judge Graham should have disqualified.   See, Case No. 01-13664, Unpublished Opinion.   Complaint No. 05-0008 Complaint filed January 29, 2005.   The complaint alleges (Core Allegations): intentionally lying and misrepresenting the law;  refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction for more than 15 months;  allowing scores of motions to go undecided;  and usurping legal authority. Additionally, Judge Graham knowing falsely created a Civil Justice Act Report that concealed the fact that he had a motion for a preliminary injunction pending for more than 15 months.  Judge Edmondson reply to these allegations: In this complaint, the single (unsupported) allegation that has not already been determined in previous complaints filed by Mr . Mason against Judge Graham is that Judge Graham intentionally falsified his March 31, 2001, Civil Justice Reform Act Report in an attempt to conceal the fact that he had not ruled on one of Mr. Mason's motions for over 15 months . Not withstanding the fact that the motion in question was pending for more than six months, and the fact that the March 31, 2001 report is incorrect, Mr. Mason has not presented any information, evidence or documentation to support his claim to suggest that the omission of this motion on this CJRA report was an intentional attempt by Judge Graham to conceal his failure to rule on the motion. The allegations of this Complaint are "frivolous", "successive", and "appropriate corrective action has been taken". Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S.C. § 352 (b)(I)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4 (b)(3) and (4) and 18(c) this Complaint is DISMISSED.    Order 05-0008.  Compare Judge Edmondson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR. Complaint No. 05-0011 Complaint filed January 31, 2005.  This complaint, in addition to the core allegations, alleges the following: Judge Graham has arrogated his own authority, much like Sadam Hussein, Stalin, Hitler, other infamous autocrats and dictators.  Specific acts of misconduct committed by Mr. Graham include, but is not limited to the following: Concocting a patently illegal injunction or pre-filing screening under the guise of “inherent authority”.  See (D.E. 878), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-878/de878.pdf. Using this patently illegal injunction to initiate and gain a criminal contempt conviction. Allowing the Eleventh Circuit to use this patently illegal injunction, (D.E. 878), rendered on September 20, 2001 , to affirm the dismissal of a case, 99-14027-CV-Graham, that closed on June 20, 2001.  Imagine that! Allowing the Eleventh Circuit to destroy my right under the “rule of law” to appeal this patently illegal injunction, (D.E. 878). Using intimidation by ordering me, Robert Waters, AUSA, Frank Smith, U.S. Probation, and others to come to a “Status/Motion Hearing” on January 9, 2005. Abusing his office and circumventing the appellate process by ordering me not to file any one page requests to file Rule 60(b) motions and refusing to put this illegal order in writing so that it can be challenged on appeal.  July 7, 2005, Judge Edmondson answered these allegations: In this complaint, there are only two allegations that have not been determined in previous complaints filed by Mr. Mason against Judge Graham. Mr. Mason first complains that Judge Graham issued a verbal order on January 14, 2005, which advised him not to file any further pleadings with the court . Mr. Mason then complains that this order was not in writing to prevent him from filing an appeal. The allegations of this Complaint are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling or frivolous or both", and the allegations of the complaint "lack any factual foundation or are conclusively refuted by objective evidence" . Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3) and (4) this Complaint is DISMISSED.   Order No. 05-0011. Compare Judge Edmondson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR. Complaint No. 05-0012 COMPLAINT FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2005.   SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT AND JUDICIAL ABUSE 1. Mr. Graham abused his office by having the U.S. Marshall, Keith L. Kluttz, come and interrogate me at my home on or about February 5, 2004 when he had no earthly reason to do so.  2. Mr. Graham abused his office by ordering me to come to “Status/Motion Hearing” on January 14, 2005 on a closed civil case, 99-14027.  3. Mr. Graham conducted a quasi criminal hearing under the guise or cloak of a “Status/Motion Hearing” in a civil matter. The AUSA and U.S. Parole were attendance at this “Status/Motion Hearing”. I was unrepresented by a competent criminal defense lawyer.  4. Graham ordered me to answer his intimidating questions in violation of my Fifth Amendment rights. Mr. Graham gave me no warning that my statements could be used against me even though the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Probation were in attendance.   On January 9, 2005, Mr. Graham concocted what he termed a “Status/Motion Hearing” order. This order was then certified on January 10, 2005 by one of Mr. Graham’s clerks. This order specifically demands that the following individuals be there: Frank Smith, U.S. Probation, Robert Waters, AUSA, Lynn Waxman, Appellate Attorney, Maria Sorolis, counsel for Highlands County. This order was picked up by Fedex on January 10, 2005 and delivered to my home on January 11, 2005. Mr. Graham scheduled this hearing for January 14, 2005 at 15:30 in Fort Pierce. Mr. Graham was already scheduled to be in Fort Pierce on this date. Mr. Graham made no effort to talk to me or my appellate attorney about dates that would be convenient to us. Mr. Graham made no prior contact with me or Ms. Waxman. At this hearing, Mr. Graham made absolutely no mention of the merits of any pending motion in the civil case, 99-14027. Mr. Graham kept saying the case was closed and not to ‘file’ anymore Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. motions or requests to file Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. motions. Mr. Graham asked U.S. Probation about the terms of my probation. Why is this needed in a civil matter? For what purpose did AUSA Robert Waters and US Parole Officer Frank Smith attend a “Status/Motion Hearing” in a civil matter? Mr. Graham has refused to put any of the “commands” he made in writing so that they could be held up to public scrutiny. Mr. Graham felt it important enough to hastily concoct a “Status/Motion Hearing”, but not important enough to memorialize is “commands” to writing. Mr. Graham does not have the legal authority to demand, under the threat of arrest, that I attend a “Status/Motion Hearing” on a closed civil case. Mr. Graham had a deputy US Marshall come by my home and interrogate me without the presence of counsel even though criminal contempt case was pending, Case No. 02-14020-CR-Moore. I was questioned by the U.S. Marshall without benefit of having an attorney present. Mr. Graham had no probable cause to send the US Marshal to my house. The mere fact that Mr. Graham disagrees with my unrelenting attacks on his record and personal integrity is not sufficient reason to “sick the dogs on me”, or US Marshal. The US Marshal’s office is not Mr. Graham’s private police force. June 27, 2005, Judge Edmondson states: In this complaint, there are four allegations that have not been determined in previous complaints filed by Mr. Mason against Judge Graham. Mr. Mason complains that Judge Graham abused his office by ordering him to appear at a Status/Motion hearing held on January 14, 2005, and that Judge Graham scheduled this hearing without any attempt to talk with him or his attorney about dates that were suitable for them. Mr. Mason also complains that Judge Graham ordered him to answer intimidating questions at this hearing without warning that his statements could be used against him even though the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Probation offices were represented and present at this hearing. Mr. Mason further complains that Judge Graham improperly and without good cause sent the U.S. Marshals as his own private police force. The allegations of this Complaint are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling", frivolous". and the allegations of the complaint "lack any factual foundation or are conclusively refuted by objective evidence" and "successive". Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3)(4) and 18 (c) this Complaint is DISMISSED. Order No. 05-0012.  Compare Judge Edmondson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR. Complaint No. 05-0013 Complaint filed February 8, 2005 In addition to the core allegations, this complaint alleges: Mr. Graham abused his office by ordering me to come to a “HEARING ON CONDUCT OF PARTIES DURING PROCEEDINGS” on December 4, 2001 on a closed civil case, 99-14027.  The case was closed on June 20, 2001. This case was on appeal since June 25, 2001, consequently, Mr. Graham no longer had jurisdiction over the case. Why do I need to a ““NOTICE OF HEARING ON CONDUCT OF PARTIES DURING PROCEEDINGS” on a closed case?  Does Mr. Graham get to order me to come to a hearing anytime he gets ready? Judge Edmondson's reply: In this complaint Mr. Mason alleges that Judge Graham abused his office by ordering to appear at a hearing on December 4, 2001, when the case in question, No. 99-CV-14027, was closed and on appeal at the time the hearing was scheduled. The allegations of this Complaint are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling". Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3) and (4) this Complaint is DISMISSED.  Order No. 05-0013.    Compare Judge Edmondson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR. Complaint No. 05-0020 Complaint filed February 16, 2005 This complaint alleges: Judge illegally blocked Mason's access to the courts by improperly denying motions to proceed without payment, in forma pauperis, on 18 different occasions, while refusing to cite a legal or factual reason for doing so as required by law.   Graham allowed IFP motions to linger for months in violation of S.D.Fla. Local Rule 7.1.B.3 which calls for a hearing on motion in 90 days.  (DE #8, 9-18-2001).  Plaintiff’s motion was filed on 3/12/01 (DE #2). It took Graham more than six months to create a reason to deny this motion that was not denied until 9-18-2001.  See (DE #8, 9-18-2001).   Graham deliberately stated misleading facts or outright lied in justifying his injunction of September 20, 2001, (DE 878), by using the very unfiled lawsuits that he denied me IFP status to support this patently illegal injunction .  For the purpose of justifying the injunction, (DE 878), Mr. Graham counted the following lawsuits as being "filed": (1)Case No. 00-14202, (2)Case No. 00-14201, (3)Case No. 00-14116, (4)Case No. 01-14074, (5)01-14078, See pgs. 1-2, DE-878, URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-878/de878.pdf.   Mr. Graham states, “Marcellus M. Mason ("Mason") has filed eleven (11)cases and/or counterclaims in this District…”  According to Mr. Graham’s own definition of “filing”, "A complaint is not considered filed until the filing fee is paid."  See  (DE -10) Case No. 00-14201.  See also (DE -10) Case No. 00-14202.  No filing fee was paid in either of the above cases because Graham arbitrarily denied me the benefit of the in forma pauperis statutes.  Using Graham’s own definition there were only 11 minus 5 or 6 lawsuits “filed.”  Case No. 00-14240 which Graham also counts was actually filed by Highlands County, not me.  Now Graham has only 5 lawsuits filed.  Case No. 01-14230 was filed in state court and removed to the S.D. Fla. by Highlands County after Graham crafted the injunction where they knew the case would be assigned to Graham.  See Notice of Removal, URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/01-14230/NoticeOfRemoval.pdf.  Graham now has only four lawsuits that I filed, not the 11 he concocted.   See Litigation Summary, URL:http://mmason.freeshell.org/LitigationSummary.doc .  The four remaining lawsuits Case Numbers 99-14042, 99-14257, 99-14314 were consolidated with Case number 99-14027.   Judge Edmondson's reply: In this complaint Mr. Mason, although worded differently that his previous complaints, re-makes the allegation that Judge Graham denied him access to the courts by summarily denying a string of motions for in forma pauperis and that Judge Graham did not identify either of the only two reasons allowed for such denial. The allegations of this Complaint are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling" and "successive". Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3) and (4) this Complaint is DISMISSED. I  Order No. 05-0020.  Compare Judge Edmondson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR. Complaint No. 05-0021 Complaint filed February 19, 2005 This complaint alleges: Mr. Graham should have disqualified himself long before any motion for attorney’s fees had been presented.   “Disqualification is mandatory for conduct that calls a judge's impartiality into question.”  U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  As this Complaint and previous complaints clearly demonstrate Judge Graham should have disqualified himself because he: (1)he intentionally misrepresented the law; (2)refused to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction for more than 16 months;(3)usurped legal authority by requiring me to seek the permission of a private law firm to communicate with my government;(4)allowed scores of motions to go undecided; (5)concocted a “pre-filing” injunction;(5)lied on a Civil Justice Act Report;(6)See Section 372(c) complaints docketed under Case Nos. 05-0008, 05-0011, 05-0012, 05-0013, and a complaint dated Wednesday, February 16, 2005 for more reasons Graham should have disqualified.    Mr. Graham and his Magistrate awarded the Defendants, Highlands County, a whopping award of $200,000 that he admitted in writing had nothing to do with the law or the “merits”.   Mr. Graham even lied in order to award the defendants $200,000  in attorney’s fees.  These allegations are fully supported by the following RECORD facts.  See (DE #882), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-882/de882.pdf . (DE 891), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-891/de891.pdf . Judge Graham intentionally lied in order to award attorney's fees of $200,000.   Mr. Graham admitted that he knew the law and was not going to follow it with respect to the awards of attorney’s fees.  At page 3 of the Report and Recommendation, Graham and his Magistrate admit that Christiansburg Garment Company v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) is the standard for awarding attorney’s fees.  Mr. Graham and his Magistrate admit that I had no chance of paying $200,000 in attorney’s fees but awarded it to the defendants anyway.   After awarding the Defendants $200, 000 in attorney’s fees against me, Mr. Graham then decided to deny me in forma pauperis status to appeal this travesty.  Moreover, Mr. Graham refused to offer any lawful reason for denying me IFP status.  See (DE #906), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-906/de906.pdf . I prevailed on a summary judgment in a lawsuit filed against me by Highlands County and Mr. Graham refused to award me costs of less than $200.00.  See (DE #27), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/00-14240/de27.pdf ; (DE #33), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/00-14240/Doc33/de33.pdf ; (DE #35), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/00-14240/Doc35/1.jpg . Judge Edmondson's reply: In this complaint Mr. Mason repeats allegations, filed in previous complaints, that Judge Graham should have recused himself, that Judge Graham refused to rule on several motions, and that Judge Graham required him to seek permission from a private law firm to communicate with his government. The only new allegation in this complaint concerns the attorney fees awarded by Judge Graham to the defendants in the amount of $200,000. Mr. Mason claims Judge Graham lied in order to grant the fees. The allegations of this Complaint are "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling" and "successive". Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3) and (4) this Complaint is DISMISSED.   Order No. 05-0021.   Compare Judge Edmondson's conclusions to JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED" and "LEGAL ERROR. What makes this order particularly offensive is that both Judge Graham, for no stated reason, and the Eleventh Circuit, both denied Mason the opportunity to appeal the $200, 000 judgment.   The Eleventh Circuit claimed the appeal of the $200,000 attorney's fees was frivolous without providing a scintilla of evidence to support its mere fortuitous and self-serving conclusion.   On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua sponte, or on his motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason.  See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) .  Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte.     EVEN MORE INCREDIBLE IS THE FACT THAT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REFUSES TO REVIEW THIS SUA SPONTE ISSUED PRE-FILING INJUNCTION FOR VALIDITY.  SEE mmason.freeshell.org/SuaSponte.htm#AppellateHistory.  ELEVENTH CIRCUIT APPELLATE TIMELINE A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 25, 2001.  (Docket Entry 795).  District Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham was assigned Eleventh Circuit Case No.  01-13664. On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham issues a pre-filing injunction, sua sponte.   See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: "THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte."  This injunction was issued was the appeal was pending and briefs had not been filed.   October 2, 2001, Mason files a Petition for Mandamus with the Eleventh Circuit seeking among other things, to vacate the sua sponte issued pre-fling injunction of September 20, 2001.   The mandamus petition is assigned Case No. 01-15754. Mason files mandamus petition despite pending appeal.   December 5, 2001, the Eleventh denies mandamus petition in a terse, one sentence page opinion.  See Opinion.  The " petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition" is DENIED."  The direct appeal, Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664, was still pending and no briefs had been filed at this point. December 12, 2001, the Eleventh denies an in forma pauperis and refuses to waive the filing fee for the direct appeal, Case No. 01-13664-A, without providing any facts, the Eleventh Circuit simply asserts in mere conclusory fashion, "appellant has not truthfully provided this Court with information concerning his ability to pay filing and docketing fees."  Order Denying IFP.   January 25, 2002, Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 01-157154, deny motion for clarification and rehearing, and refuse to provide legal or factual basis for denying mandamus petition.  Order Denying Clarification.    On March 6, 2002, Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664, the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason's brief for arguing against the September 20, 2001 sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Mason to file all new initial briefs less any mention of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction. The Eleventh Circuit claimed the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction was "beyond the scope of appeal". See Order Striking Appellant's Brief.   On March 25, 2002, 19 days after the Eleventh Circuit, struck Mason's brief for arguing against the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, Highlands County argued for the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction in their Answer Brief on pages 18 and 19. However, the Eleventh Circuit, while granting Mason's motion to strike Highlands County brief for arguing for the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, did not make Highlands County file all new answer briefs as they had done Mason. The Eleventh Circuit claimed that it would not consider the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction in its decision.  See Order Striking Appellees' Brief.   On October 16, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit decided the direct appeal, D.C. Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham, 11th Cir. Case No. 01-13664. Opinion (pdf). In the entirety of the very verbose 14 page (unpublished) opinion, there is no discussion as to why the so-called "discovery orders",[(D.E. #201); ,[(D.E. #246)] were or were not violative of the First Amendment; however, there is ample discussion about Mason's so-called violation of these "discovery orders."  The Eleventh Circuit ignores the issue of whether or not Judge Graham should have disqualified even though it admitted it had been fully briefed on the issue.   See Disqualification Issue.   Additionally, the Eleventh does not mention the record acts of judicial misconduct and abuse that were cited to support to support the issue of disqualification.  Lastly, and even more egregious, the Eleventh Circuit uses the sua sponte issued pre-fling injunction of September 20, 2001 that it said it was "beyond the scope of appeal" and promised not consider to justify a Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. that occurred on June 20, 2001.  See "Implicit finding Beyond the Scope.", pgs. 13, 14, Opinion.       IMPORTANT BACKGROUND AND CONCURRENT FACTS In order to fully understand the lengths that Judge Edmondson and his cohorts at the Eleventh Circuit are willing to go through to conceal the acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance committed by Judge Donald L. Graham, one must read the opinions in the direct appeal, Case No. 01-13664 and mandamus petition, Case No. 01-15754 ("The "petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition" is DENIED.") in conjunction with the complaints listed below.  The Eleventh Circuit does not deny the allegations it simply ignores them.  In the direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges that it was briefed on the issue that Judge Graham should have disqualified because of the alleged misconduct, however, it refuses to discuss this issue on appeal ("Mason also raises issues that relate to non-sanction matters, ... the denial of his motions to disqualify the district court and magistrate judges,").   Similarly, it refuses to discuss this issue in mandamus petition.    The Eleventh Circuit and Judge Edmondson employed a perfect strategy to  conceal these allegations of misconduct.  The direct appeal and mandamus orders are non-published.  Neither of these opinions have ever been available in the Court's database or released.  Couple this fact, with the fact that the Judicial Misconduct Complaints are kept confidential no one would ever know save this website.   It is noteworthy and quite revealing that upon reading the complaints and Judge Edmondson's replies that he does not deny, because he can not, any of the allegations set forth in any of the complaints below.   The point of the foregoing is that Judge Edmondson and his cohorts knew full well that when these complaints were lodged that the Eleventh Circuit had refused to address these allegations in the appellate process.  Consequently, there is no remedy for these acts of misconduct and abuse.   CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Federal Judges are governed by the Code of Conduct For United States Judges.  The following canons of the Code appeared to have been violated or least implicated by the documented behavior of Judge Donald L. Graham: A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY . Canon 1.  An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.  Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges. A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.  Canon 2.   A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canon 2A.  Actual improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this Code. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY Canon 3.  A judge should hear and decide matters assigned, unless disqualified, and should maintain order and decorum in all judicial proceedings. Canon 3A(2).  A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or the person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte communications on the merits, or procedures affecting the merits, of a pending or impending proceeding.  Canon 3A(4).  A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.  Canon 3A(5).  In disposing of matters promptly, efficiently and fairly, a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard and to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay.  In U.S. v. Microsoft,  253 F.3d 34, 107 (D.C. Cir., 2001), Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, was excoriated by the court for the following violations of the code: Canon 3A(6) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires federal judges to "avoid public comment on the merits of [ ] pending or impending" cases. Canon 2 tells judges to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities," on the bench and off. Canon 3A(4) forbids judges to initiate or consider ex parte communications on the merits of pending or impending proceedings. Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code requires judges to recuse themselves when their "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). All indications are that the District Judge violated each of these ethical precepts by talking about the case with reporters. The violations were deliberate, repeated, egregious, and flagrant.  In Microsoft, the court considered the preceding violations of the code to be Judicial Misconduct.  In the fact, the conduct described was labeled "Judicial Misconduct."   GLOSSARY MISFEASANCE - The performance of an act which might lawfully be done, in an improper manner, by which another person receives an injury. It differs from malfeasance, or, nonfeasance. MALFEASANCE - The unjust performance of some act which the party had no right, or which he had contracted not to do. It differs from misfeasance, and nonfeasance. NON FEASANCE - The non-performance of some act which ought to be performed. RECORD SUPPORT FOR ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT AGAINST JUDGE DONALD L. GRAHAM Allowed a motion for a preliminary injunction to languish in court for 574 days and not making a ruling.  The motion for preliminary in injunction was initially filed on November 24, 1999. See (DE #39).  See PacerReportsDocketEntries99-14027.html.   The case was closed on June 20, 2001 because Marcellus Mason communicated with the government out of court. Essentially, Graham gave himself permission not to rule on a motion for injunctive relief.  Despite repeated requests, Graham refused to disclose why he wouldn't rule on the motion for a preliminary injunction.  As a side matter, when Marcellus Mason filed a petition for mandamus (Case No. 01-11305) with the Eleventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit simply stated:  "His mandamus petition, however, is frivolous because he has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief to compel the district court to rule on his motion for preliminary injunction."  See Order Dated April 26, 2001, page1, page 2.  As recently as May 20, 2004, Case No. 04-11894, Judges Carnes and Hull, were willing to intentionally misstate the facts in order to cover for Judge Graham.  Proof?  "Mason merely asserts that Judge Graham was not impartial because (1) he allowed many of Mason's motions to languish...As to the alleged languishing, a review of the district court docket sheet shows that the court ruled upon his motions in a timely manner ."  See pgs. 2, 3 Case No. 04-11894 Opinion.  How is NEVER ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction ruling  "upon his motions in a timely manner"?  Review the docket and see where Graham ruled on the motion for preliminary injunction, (DE #39).  See PacerReportsDocketEntries99-14027.html.  Concealing Information and Falsely Completing a Civil Justice Reform Act Report.  When Graham completed his Civil Justice Reform Act Report for March 31, 2001, he shows that he has no motions pending for more than 6 months.  This information is false because the motion for a preliminary injunction had been pending for more 492 days or about 16.4 months.  CJRA Report.   Usurped legal authority in violation of the First and Tenth Amendment. Judge Graham allowed his Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr. to  issue orders stating that Marcellus Mason must request the permission of private for profit attorneys in order to speak to the government. "Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants [government], Highlands County Board of County Commissioners],..." Even without the Constitutional problems associated with this injunction, it was issued by a magistrate who is precluded by statute from issuing an injunction. These orders are clearly injunctions and were issued by a Magistrate who is precluded by 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A) from issuing an injunction; " a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief.  Judge Graham has expressly stated that a Magistrate may issued an injunction.  See Order, (D.E. #407).  Judge Graham actually dismissed a lawsuit because he said Mason talked to the government without the permission of a private for profit law firm. See Court Order, (Doc. #201) . Judge Graham adamantly refuses to state where a Magistrate Judge, who issued this injunction, gets the legal authority to do so. See for example, and note that this list is not collectively exhausted, Case No. 99-14027 see Plaintiff's motions and responses, (Doc. #200);(Doc. #239); (Doc. #262);(Doc. #264);(Doc. #284);(Doc. #334);(Doc. #509);(Doc. #515);(Doc. #526);(Doc. 554); (Doc. 632, pg. 5);(Doc. #633);(Doc. 652);(Doc. 663); (Doc. 735); (Doc. 736); (Doc. 738); (Doc. 783); (Doc. 787, pgs 2-3); (Doc. 810); (Doc. 812); (Doc. 813); (Doc. 817); (Doc. 829), (Doc. 845);and the court's orders: (DE #201), page 2,(DE #246), page 2,;(Doc. #279);(Doc. #281);(Doc. #407, pg. 2 ); (Doc. #524);(Doc. #528);(Doc. #634);(Doc. 673);(Doc. 744);(Doc. 745);(Doc. 766);(Doc. 791);(Doc. 874, pgs. 1, 2);(Doc. 882, pgs. 1-2), (DE-890), (DE-928), Usurping legal authority by telling a non lawyer that he must seek the permission of a private for profit law firm in order to request public records under Florida Law. "Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' [government, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners] counsel including any requests for public records." (DE #246), page 2. See 01-0054, HTML Format.   Allowing scores of motions to languish in court for up to 8 months and not taking any action. See Languishing Motions and Section 372(c) Complaint, See Eleventh Circuit Special Docket No.: 01-0054, HTML Format. As recently as May 20, 2004, Case No. 04-11894, Judges Carnes and Hull, were willing to intentionally lie or misstate the facts in order to cover for Judge Graham. Proof? "Mason merely asserts that Judge Graham was not impartial because (1) he allowed many of Mason's motions to languish...As to the alleged languishing, a review of the district court docket sheet shows that the court ruled upon his motions in a timely manner ." See pgs. 2, 3 Case No. 04-11894 Opinion. How is NEVER ruling on scores of motions and filings ruling "upon his motions in a timely manner"? Review the docket and see where Graham never ruled on the motions and filings listed above.    See mmason.freeshell.org/CompleteDocket.htm.  Lying and intentionally misrepresenting the law.  A judge's honesty and integrity lie at the very heart of that system. See In re Shenberg, 632 So. 2d 42, 47 (Fla. 1992). Judge Donald L. Graham did this by telling Marcellus Mason one version of the law and another version of the law to a different Plaintiff. Graham stated in Mason's lawsuit that he could not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against a state actor [Highlands County Board of County Commissioners] while at the very same time he allowed a Plaintiff to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the very same state actor [Highlands County Board of County Commissioners] . In Mason's lawsuit, Case No. 99-14027-CIV-Graham, Graham's Court stated: "Counts Eight, Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Five deal with §1981 claims. This Court believes that those claims should likewise be dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891(11th Cir. 2000). In Butts, the Eleventh Circuit held that §1983 constituted the exclusive remedy against state actors for violation of rights contained in §1981. The Plaintiff has a valid §1983 count pending concerning his termination of employment. He has two Title VII claims as well as a disparate treatment claim pending. The Plaintiffs response does not give sufficient reason why he is entitled to plead a §1981 claim in light of the Buffs decision. Therefore, this Court is going to recommend to the District Court that Counts Eight, Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Five be dismissed with prejudice." See Page 3, Report and Recommendation, (DE #435). Graham signed this Report and Recommendation. See Order (DE #466), page 2.  At the very same time, Graham was saying that Mason could not state a claim against a state actor [Highlands County Board of County Commissioners] under §1981, he was allowing the Plaintiff to state a claim under §1981 against the very same state actor, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, in Case No. 00-14094-CIV-Graham, Fa Nina St. Germain v. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners. Fa Nina St. Germain's §1981 was disposed of on the facts, not the law and not Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891(11th Cir. 2000), in Case No. 00-14094-CIV-Graham. See Pages 2, Order on Summary Judgment, pages Case No. 00-14094, (PDF). Clearly, Judge Graham either lied to Marcellus Mason or Fa Nina St. Germain as he could not have told the truth to the both of them.  As recently as May 20, 2004, Case No. 04-11894, Judges Carnes and Hull, were willing to intentionally misstate the facts in order to cover for Judge Graham. Proof?  Mason merely asserts that Judge Graham was not impartial because . (2) would not let Mason file a § 1981 claim, but did let another plaintiff with similar claims do so... Moreover, a review of Mason's complaint and the other plaintiff's complaint reveal that their claims are not similar. Mason's complaint alleges that county entities and employees violated his First Amendment rights, which is actually a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The plaintiff to which Mason compares himself, however, brought racial and national origin discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) and § 1981. Both Title VII and § 1981 can be used to bring race discrimination claims. See pgs. 2-3, Opinion, Eleventh Circuit Case No. No. 04-11894-B.  Both Judge Graham and the Eleventh Circuit know that this assertion is false because Mason's complaint specifically alleges racial discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) and § 1981. See (DE #321, pps. 1, 2, 11; 63-64, 65, ¶¶1, 2, 3, 85, 459-462, 465-466, 473-474).    Judge Graham abused the criminal contempt procedure. Judge Graham  took an illegal and void order and made it the basis of a criminal contempt complaint.  For a full discussion of this matter, Manufacturing a Criminal.  On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a "filing injunction" against Mason.  See Court Order, Docket Entry (DE #878).  This "filing injunction" came three months after the case was closed on June 20, 2001 and noticed for appeal on June 25, 2001. Judge Graham got angry after repeated motions from Mason demanding to know where got the legal authority to issue orders like "Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' [government, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners] counsel including any requests for public records." (DE #246), page 2. "  Judge Graham absolutely refused to answer the inquiry and issued this filing injunction.  If you read the very first page of the narrative, pg. 3, it says "THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte".  Docket Entry (DE #878).  Sua Sponte issued filing injunctions are routinely rejected by the courts.  See mmason.freeshell.org/RejectSuaSponte.htm.  A filing injunction issued sua sponte is void and illegal.  Generally, a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) "If the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction if the subject matter, or the of the parties, of it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." (citations omitted). A judgment is also void for Rule 60(b)(4) purposes if the rendering court was powerless to enter it."  Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001); Oakes v. Horizon Financial, 259 F.3d 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 662 (1st Cir. 1990); Beller & Keller v. Tyler, 120 F.3d 21, 23 (2nd Cir. 1997); Union Switch & Signal v. Local 610, 900 F.2d 608, 612 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1990); Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Const., Inc. 167 F.3d 861, 867 (4th Cir. 1999); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996); Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); General Star v. Administratia Asigurarilor, 289 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2002); Federal Election Com'n v. Al Salvi For Senate, 205 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000); Chambers v. Armontrout, 16 F.3d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999); Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 232 F.3d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 2000).  "A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees." ; Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). The Eleventh Circuit own cases, and other Courts as well also supports this notion. The Eleventh Circuit has expressly stated that "'[t]he key to unlocking a court's inherent power is a finding of bad faith.' (internal citations omitted)' [I]nvocation of a court's inherent power requires a finding of bad faith.' A court should be cautious in exerting its inherent power and 'must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees. 'Because the court's inherent power is so potent, it should be exercised 'with restraint and discretion.'"  Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001)." In addition, the accused must be given an opportunity to respond, orally or in writing, to the invocation of such sanctions and to justify his actions."  In Re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995).; Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002)("for the imposition of sanctions to be proper, a court 'must comply with the mandates of due process..'"); Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998); First Bank Of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21117, *25; 2002 FED App. 0356P (6th Cir. 2002) (" A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process."); In Re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2002)("[A] district court's inherent powers are not infinite. the use of inherent powers must comport with procedural fairness."). "[T]he mere passage of time cannot convert an absolutely void judgment into a valid one."  Jackson v. Fie Corp,. 01-30679, 302 F.3d 515, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16703 (5th Cir. 2002). LEGAL AUTHORITY ALLOWING COMMUNICATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT Florida Government officials have no right "not to be communicated with directly" even if they are being sued.  In fact, Florida governments are obligated to divulge information relating to the case even if involved in bitter litigation with another party.  "Courts cannot judicially create any exceptions, or exclusions to Florida's Public Records Act." Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 585, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). See also Wait v. Florida Power and Light Company, 372 So. 2d 420, 425 (Fla. 1979) (holding that a litigant engaging in litigation before a federal forum, does not give up its independent statutory rights to review public records under chapter 119). <>These orders are clearly injunctions and were issued by a Magistrate who is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) from issuing an injunction.  " a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief" The comments to Florida Bar Rule 4-4.2 states the following: This rule does not prohibit communication with a party, or an employee or agent of a party, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and private party, or between 2 organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a lawyer having independent justification for communicating with the other party to a controversy with a government agency with a government officials abut the matter. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter. <> "[T]here is nothing that prohibits one party to a litigation from making direct contact with another party to the same litigation.  These rules are designed to regulate the conduct of nonlawyers, and simply do not apply to the conduct of nonlawyers."  E.E.O.C. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 948 F.Supp. 54, 55 (E.D.Mo. 1996). The order constituted an illegal prior restraint. In Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 578 (Fed. 5th Cir., 2005), the district court “enjoined Singh from communicating directly with, threatening, or harassing Test Masters Educational Services, Inc., its employees, its staff, or TES's counsel, counsel's employees, or counsel's staff.”  The Fifth Circuit, (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993), defined “prior restraints” thusly:  Prior restraints are "administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur."  Id. at 579.  The Fifth Circuit then expressly declared: “The district court's order enjoining Singh from having any future communication with the specified persons was a prior restraint.” Id.  The Court went on to find: To quote selectively from the district court, the court found that the parties had demonstrated an "immaturity" and "mean-spirited[ness]," and that Singh was pursuing "vexatious litigation." However, despite the perhaps need of these parties to never speak again, the court did not detail, and the record does not reflect, any "exceptional circumstances" to justify permanently enjoining Singh from generally communicating with TES, TES's counsel and their staff and employees. The district court's order enjoining Singh from communicating with TES employees, TES's counsel, and its counsel's employees was a prior restraint limiting Singh's first amendment rights, and because the injunction order is not supported by exceptional circumstances, it is an unconstitutional restraint on Singh's free speech rights. *** The cantankerous relationship between these parties is clearly evident from the record in this case. There is enough evidence presented in the record to justify an injunction order prohibiting Singh from threatening or harassing TES, its employees, its staff, TES's counsel, counsel's employees, or counsel's staff. However, the injunction here went beyond enjoining harassing and threatening conduct. The district court's order swept too broadly when it prohibited all communication between Singh and TES employees, staff or TES's counsel, counsel's employees or counsel's staff. Id. at 579-80. If the Plaintiff in Test Masters has the first amendment right to engage in hostility and vitriol with a private entity, then surely Mason has the same right to engage in hostility and vitriol with a government entity like Highlands County that the First Amendment expressly permits, Judge Lynch’s personal notions of civility notwithstanding.  Every jurisdiction in the United States has affirmed a citizen's right to petition the government even in the midst of bitter litigation. See American Canoe Ass'n Inc. v. City of St. Albans, 18 F.Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.W.Va. 1998); Camden v. State Of Md., 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1118 n.8 (D. Md. 1996); Frey v. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 106 F.R.D. 32, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Holdren v. General Motors Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D.Kan. 1998); In Re Discipline Of Schaefer, 117 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 44, 36173 (Nev. 2001); In Re Hurley, Case No. No. 97-6058 SI, (8th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Scientific Colors, Inc., Case Nos. 99 C 1959/00 C 171 (N.D.Ill. 2001); Loatman v. Summit Bank, 174 F.R.D. 592 (D.N.J. 1997); Miano v. AC & R Advertising, Inc, 148 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y.1993); Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 578 A.2d 1075,1079 (Conn. 1990) <>§ 99, Restatement Third The Law Governing Lawyers [page 2] in pertinent part states: No general rule prevents a lawyer's client, either personally or through a nonlawyer agent, from communicating directly with a represented nonclient Thus, while neither a lawyer nor a lawyer's investigator or other agent (see Comment be hereto) may contact the represented nonclient, the same bar does not extend to the client of the lawyer or the clients investigator or other agent.

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