IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR HIGHLANDS COUNTY,
FLORIDA
CASE
NO. GC-01-587
MARCELLUS M. MASON, JR.
Plaintiff,
Vs.
HIGHLANDS
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
DONALD
L. GRAHAM, FRANK LYNCH, JR., BRIAN KOJI, MARIA SOROLIS
Defendants
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, MARCELLUS M. MASON, JR., (hereinafter
“Mason”),hereby files this Complaint and sues
Defendant HIGHLANDS COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS hereinafter,
“HIGHLANDS,” DONALD L. GRAHAM, FRANK LYNCH, JR., BRIAN KOJI, MARIA SOROLIS ,
and alleges:
1.
This
is a civil action against HIGHLANDS, for willfully violating Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended the Civil Rights Act of 1991; violation of
Florida Statutes §760.120, as amended in 1992. This action is also brought
under 42 U.S.C §§1981,1983.
2.
This action is based upon repeated acts of
racial discrimination by HIGHLANDS against Mason that culminated with the
failure of Highlands to hire Mason for the position of Budget Technician.
3.
Additionally,
this is a civil action against FRANK LYNCH JR., DONALD L. GRAHAM, MARIA
SOROLIS, and BRIAN KOJI for willfully violating the plaintiff’s First Amendment
protections. This action is also brought under 42 U.S.C §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986.
4.
This
action is based upon two illegal orders rendered by the Lynch/Graham duo in
Case No. 99-14027. The orders of June
19, 2000 (DE #201) and July 25, 2000 (DE #246) are patently illegal and
blatantly violates this plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights. These orders
repeatedly violated Mason’s First Amendment Rights.
THE PARTIES
5.
Plaintiff,
Marcellus M. Mason, Jr. (Mason) is a United States citizen residing in Sebring,
Florida.
6.
Defendant,
HIGHLANDS, is a political subdivision of the State of Florida with its
principal place of business in Sebring, Florida.
7.
This
action is a pattern and practice discrimination complaint with respect to the
promotion, hiring, and discharge policies of the Highlands County Board of
County Commissioners and African Americans.
8.
This action is based
upon continuing violations and repeated acts of racial discrimination by
HIGHLANDS against African Americans since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
9.
Highlands
has engaged in unabated racial discrimination since before 1964.
10.
Defendant,
FRANK LYNCH JR, is a United States Magistrate Judge for the Fort Pierce
Division, Southern District Court, Southern District, United States District
Court.
11.
Defendant,
DONALD L. GRAHAM, is a United States District Judge for the Fort Pierce
Division, Southern District Court, Southern District, United States District
Court.
12.
Allen,
Norton & Blue, is a law firm with an office located at 324 South Hyde Park
Avenue, Suite 350, Tampa, FL, 33606.
13.
Defendant,
MARIA SOROLIS, is an attorney with the law firm of Allen, Norton, Blue.
14.
Defendant,
BRIAN KOJI, is an attorney with the law firm of Allen, Norton, Blue.
ALLEGATIONS
15.
Mason
has complied with all administrative prerequisites prior to filing this
action. Mason timely filed his charge
of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter referred to as “EEOC”), BEARING CHARGE NUMBER 150-A0-1181. Thereafter, a “RIGHT TO SUE” letter was
issued by the EEOC on March 30, 2000. See
Exhibit 1 attached Initial Complaint.
16.
Mason
originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on July 3, 2000 bearing Case No.
00-14201-CIV-Graham. Contemporaneous
with the fling of the Complaint, Mason filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
17.
After
more than four months the District Judge, Donald Graham, decided to deny the
motion to proceed in forma pauperis
on or November 2, 2000. As a result of
the Court’s denying Mason’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the lawsuit was subsequently dismissed without
prejudice.
18.
Mason
subsequently appealed this denial of his in
forma pauperis motion to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal in an
unpublished decision “affirmed” the District Court’s denial of Mason’s in forma pauperis motion because the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Mason abandoned the only argument he had on
appeal.
19.
Mason
immediately filed a motion for re-hearing with the Eleventh Circuit that was
denied without an opinion on October 31, 2001.
On November 9, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit issued its mandate.
20.
Venue
is proper in Highlands County because that is where Mason resides and where
HIGHLANDS principal place of business is and where the unlawful acts which the
subject of this Complaint occurred.
ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
21.
Mason is an African American male who holds a
four-year degree in Finance from the Florida State University
22.
Mason
has extensive experience work experience in the fields of Finance and
Budgeting.
23.
On
or about November 12, 1999, Mason applied for the position of Budget Technician
with the Highlands County Board of County Commissioners.
24.
This
position had a closing date of November 29, 1999.
25.
Highlands
refused to give Mason’s application serious consideration as evidenced by the
fact that they did not grant Mason an interview.
26.
Highlands
did not even burden themselves with the courtesy of letting Mason know someone
else had been hired for the job.
27.
Mason
was far more qualified for the position than all other candidates.
28.
A
less qualified white person was subsequently hired by Highlands for the job.
29.
Highlands
County has permanently barred Mason from employment with Highlands County and
Heartland Library Cooperative.
30.
Highlands
County has failed to hold the hearing required in A-10.04B.4.b. prior to
barring the Plaintiff from Highlands County permanently.
31.
Highlands
County has barred Mason from employment permanently because Mason has opposed
discrimination.
32.
Highlands
has permanently barred Mason from employment because Mason has “threatened
litigation.”
33.
To
the best knowledge of plaintiff, a lifetime resident of Highlands County, in
the entire existence of Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, there
has never been a director or an assistant director under any of its various
departments that was an African American.
34.
To
the best and informed knowledge of plaintiff, a lifelong resident of Highlands
County, plaintiff asserts that African Americans having equivalent
qualifications to whites are hired less frequently than whites for all pay
grades and job levels. This is a trend and practice that has continued since
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
35.
African
Americans having equivalent qualifications to whites are paid less than
whites. This is a trend and practice
that has continued since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
36.
Highlands
hires whites for jobs that are not competitively advertised to the African
American society in Highlands County. This is a trend and practice that has
continued since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
37.
HIGHLANDS
has modified its use of its official hiring polices and guidelines in order to
target and hire specific white individuals. This is a trend and practice that
has continued since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
38.
The
hiring procedures followed by Highlands routinely excludes qualified African
Americans consideration from certain positions consideration by design. This is
a trend and practice that has continued since the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
39.
African
Americans statistical presence in the Highlands County Board of County
Commissioners workforce is less than its statistical presence in the general
population of Highlands County. This is a trend and practice that has continued
since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
40.
For
any single position, African Americans’ statistical presence in the workforce
of the Highlands County Board of County Commissioners is significantly less
than the qualified pool of African Americans.
41.
To
the best knowledge of plaintiff, African Americans are more likely to be more
severely disciplined than white employees for alleged equivalent violations of
rules.
42.
African
Americans are more likely to be terminated than whites.
43.
As
a part of its grievance process, Highlands has in almost every case included a
panel consisting exclusively of whites.
44.
As
a part of its interviewing committee for any single position, historically the
panel has almost exclusively consisted of whites with blacks almost never
appearing on this committee.
45.
The
upper level management positions of the Highlands County Board of County
Commissioners is almost exclusively filled with whites and no African
Americans.
46.
African
Americans hold no or very few jobs in upper level management with
Highlands. This is trend that has
continued unabated since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.
47.
African
Americans are highly concentrated in numbers above statistical expectations in
the lower paying jobs of Highlands.
48.
African
Americans are disproportionately denied promotions and pay raises because of
Highlands’ purely subjective promotion policies. This is trend that has
continued unabated since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.
49.
Highlands
uses no objective criteria in deciding who are qualified for promotions and pay
raises.
50.
African
Americans, if ever, have rarely been included in a decision to determine
whether or not an African American merited a promotion or pay raise. This is
trend that has continued unabated since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
in 1964.
51.
Highlands
promotional practices and procedures as set forth in its Highlands County BCC
Rules and Regulations do not allow for cultural differences between white
Americans and African Americans.
52.
Highlands
hiring practices and procedures as set forth in its Highlands County BCC Rules
and Regulations do not allow for cultural differences between white Americans
and African Americans.
53.
Highlands
discharge practices and procedures as set forth in its Highlands County BCC
Rules and Regulations do not allow for cultural differences between white
Americans and African Americans.
54.
In
enforcing the provisions of the its Highlands County BCC Rules and Regulations,
Highlands has not uniformly followed its owns policies with respect to whites
and African Americans.
55.
Mason
was not hired for the position because he was black.
COUNT ONE
(1) – VIOLATION OF TITLE VII (HIRING)
56.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
57.
HIGHLANDS’
actions against Mason were in violation of Title VII, as amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.
58.
Defendants’
refusal to hire Plaintiff was wrongful because it was motivated by Defendants
racial animus/discrimination and motivated by Defendants desire to retaliate
against Plaintiff for his making complaints about acts made unlawful by Title
VII and by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
COUNT TWO (2) – VIOLATION FLORIDA
STATUTE §760.10 (Hiring)
59.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
60.
HIGHLANDS’
actions against Mason were in violation of Florida Statute §760.10
61.
Defendants’
refusal to hire Plaintiff was wrongful because it was motivated by Defendants
racial animus/discrimination and motivated by Defendants desire to retaliate
against Plaintiff for his making complaints about acts made unlawful by Title
VII and by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
COUNT
THREE (3)- VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1981
62.
Mason adopts and
incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1) through nine
(9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set forth herein.
63.
HIGHLANDS’ actions against
Mason were in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981 and the aforementioned allegations
represent intentional discrimination.
COUNT FOUR (4)- VIOLATION OF TITLE VII (Retaliation)
64.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1) through
nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set forth
herein.
65.
HIGHLANDS’
actions against Mason and other similar situated individuals were in violation
of Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and codified at 42 U.S.C.
§2000e, et seq.
66.
Defendant’s
refusal to hire Plaintiff and other similar situated individuals was wrongful
because it was motivated by retaliation of previously filed lawsuits and EEOC
Complaints.
COUNT FIVE (5)- VIOLATION OF Fla.Stat. §760.10 (Retaliation)
67.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
68.
HIGHLANDS’
actions against Mason were in violation of Florida Statute §760.10.
69.
Defendant’s
refusal to hire Plaintiff and other similar situated individuals was wrongful
because it was motivated by retaliation of previously filed lawsuits and EEOC
Complaints.
COUNT SIX (6)- VIOLATION OF TITLE VII (disparate treatment)
70.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
71.
HIGHLANDS’
actions against Mason and other similar situated individuals were in violation
of Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and codified at 42
U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.
72.
Defendant
has deliberately treated and continues to treat its African American employees
and applicants in a manner that was and is unfavorable and detrimental to
African Americans when compared to similar situations and treatments of white
employees and applicants.
COUNT SEVEN
(7)- VIOLATION OF Fla.Stat. §760.10 (disparate treatment)
73.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
74.
HIGHLANDS’
actions against Mason and other similar situated individuals were in violation
of Fla.Stat. §760.10, et seq.
75.
Defendant
has deliberately treated and continues to treat its African American employees
and applicants in a manner that was and is unfavorable and detrimental to
African Americans when compared to similar situations and treatments of white
employees and applicants.
COUNT EIGHT (8)- VIOLATION OF TITLE VII (disparate impact)
76.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
77.
HIGHLANDS’
actions against Mason and other similar situated individuals were in violation
of Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and codified at 42
U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.
78.
Defendant
has administered its facially neutral personnel policies in such a way that
African American employees and applicants have been adversely impacted.
COUNT NINE
(9)- VIOLATION OF Fla.Stat. §760.10 (disparate impact)
79.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
80.
HIGHLANDS’
actions against Mason and other similar situated individuals were in violation
of Fla.Stat. §760.10, et seq.
81.
Defendant
has administered its facially neutral personnel policies in such a way that
African American employees and applicants have been adversely impacted.
COUNT
TEN (10)-VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION 42 U.S.C § 1983
82.
Mason adopts and
incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1) through nine
(9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set forth herein.
83.
Based
on the foregoing, HIGHLANDS has denied Mason the equal protection of the laws,
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
is liable for such pursuant to, 42 U.S.C. §1983.
84.
Defendant
was acting under color of state law.
COUNT ELEVEN (11)-VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS 42 U.S.C § 1983
85.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
86.
Based
on the foregoing, HIGHLANDS has denied Mason due process of laws, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is liable
for such pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
87.
Defendant
was acting under color of state law.
COUNT TWELVE (12)-VIOLATION 42
U.S.C § 1983- DEPRIVATION OF FREE SPEECH
88.
Mason
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1)
through nine (9) and fifteen (15) through fifty-five (55) as if fully set
forth herein.
89.
Based
on the foregoing, HIGHLANDS has punished Mason for exercising his right of free
speech, in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and is liable for such pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
90.
Defendant
was acting under color of state law.
ILLEGAL AND UNETHICAL ACTS COMMITTED BY GRAHAM, LYNCH, SOROLIS,
AND KOJI
92.
On
or about February 4, 1999, Mason filed a lawsuit with the Fort Pierce Division,
Southern District, United States District Court that was ultimately docketed
under case No. 99-14027.
93.
This
case was styled Marcellus M. Mason, Jr.
v. HEARTLAND LIBRARY COOPERATIVE, et.al. All of the defendants in this action are governments and their
agents within the Great State of Florida.
94.
On
or about August 18, 1999, Mark E. Levitt, Maria Sorolis, and Brian Koji of the
Law Firm of Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. made their appearance in the
foregoing case for all of the defendants.
95.
Unless
specifically stated otherwise all references to a lawsuit or action will be to
Case No. 99-14027.
96.
This
case was originally assigned to the Honorable Judge Davis and subsequently
reassigned to Donald L. Graham.
97.
Frank
Lynch was assigned as the Magistrate Judge shortly after the lawsuit was filed.
98.
On
or about 6/15/00 , Maria Sorolis filed a Defendants’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction. (DE #199). Sorolis alleged
that Mason had repeatedly contacted the government defendants in this
action.
99.
Sorolis
and her government clients were unhappy with the alleged communications that
Mason was having with the government defendants in this matter.
100.
Sorolis
acknowledges in her motion that Mason as a non-lawyer, is not subject to the
Florida Rules of Ethics which governs the conduct of attorneys. Sorolis cited no legal authority for the
“injunction” that she requested that the court impose upon Mason.
101.
On
or about 6/19/00, Lynch granted the defendants’ motion for a injunction. (DE #201).
102.
This
order of June 19, 2000 stated, “{Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting
any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the
individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case. Plaintiff shall correspond on with
Defendants’ counsel.” Lynch cites no
legal authority for this order. Lynch
threatened to dismiss Mason’s lawsuit if Mason violated this order.
103.
In
his order of June 19, 2000, Lynch states, “[T]his court is considering this
Motion as a pretrial discovery issue and not injunction per se…”
104.
Lynch
as a Magistrate Judge does not have the legal authority to issue an injunction
and Lynch is fully cognizant of the fact.
105.
Lynch
does not cite the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure by which he relied upon to
render his “pretrial discovery issue and not injunction per se.’
106.
On or about 7/12/00 , Brian Koji filed a
Defendants’ Renewed Motion for a preliminary injunction. (DE #231). In this motion Koji stated, “[Defendants
request that this Court enter an Order prohibiting Plaintiff from directly
contacting them for any matter.” Koji
cites no legal authority for the relief he requested.
107.
In
his motion of 7/12/00, Koji alleges that the plaintiff was trying to frighten
witnesses. Koji complains about Mason
making Public Record requests directly to the government defendants rather than
to his private for profit law firm.
108.
On
7/25/00, Lynch entered an order granting the motion as requested by Koji. (DE #246).
Lynch cites no legal authority for his order. Lynch again refers to his order as a “pretrial discovery issue and
not an injunction per se.”
109.
Lynch’s
Order of July 25, 2000 states:1) Plaintiff
shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their
supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter
related to this case;2)Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendant’s counsel
including any requests for public records;3) Plaintiff shall be prohibited from
contacting any of the named Defendants in this case, including their
supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, who are parties in
other actions (Fellin, St. Germain, etc:) and are
represented by counsel in those other actions regarding any matter related to
those cases since Plaintiff is not an attorney or the attorney of record for
the plaintiffs in those other cases. Lynch threatened to dismiss Mason’s
lawsuit if Mason violated this order.
110.
During
the course of this lawsuit [Case No. 99-14027], Graham and Lynch were
repeatedly told by Mason and presented with numerous memorandums of law that
clearly showed that the orders of June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000 were illegal
and void ab initio.
111.
Mason
repeatedly told Graham and Lynch that they had no legal authority to discipline
or otherwise control Mason’s private out of court behavior or actions.
112.
Mason
repeatedly told Graham and Lynch that they had no jurisdiction with respect
public records requests made by Mason to the Florida government defendants.
113.
Mason
repeatedly told Graham and Lynch that Public Records under Florida Law were not
their business.
114.
Graham
is not a State Attorney for Florida.
115.
Graham
is not a police officer within the State of Florida.
116.
Lynch
is not a State Attorney for Florida.
117.
Lynch
is not a police officer within the State of Florida.
118.
On
or about 3/2/01, Koji filed a Defendants’ Motion For Sanctions In the Form Of
Dismissal Of Plaintiff’s Action And Supporting Memorandum of Law. (DE #511). Koji alleged that Mason violated
the court orders of June 19, 2000 (De #201) and July 25, 2000 (DE #246) that
prohibited Mason from communicating with the government defendants.
119.
On
4/9/01, Koji filed a Defendants’ Second Motion For Sanctions In the Form Of
Dismissal Of Plaintiff’s Action And Supporting Memorandum of Law. (DE #646). Koji alleged that Mason violated
the court orders of June 19, 2000 (DE #201) and July 25, 2000 (DE #246) that
prohibited Mason from communicating with the government defendants or making
public record requests directly to the government.
120.
On
or about May 31, 2001, Lynch authored his sloppily written and mere conclusory
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, hereafter, “R&R,” that recommended that Mason’s
action be dismissed. (DE #766). Lynch recommended Mason’s action be
dismissed because of Mason’s unwillingness to comply with his orders of June
19, 2000 (DE #201) and July 25, 2000 (DE #246).
121.
Lynch
does not even attempt to state where thinks he derives the legal authority in
his R&R to issue the orders in question.
122.
Lynch
justifies his orders of June 19, 2000 (DE #201) and July 25, 2000 (DE #246) by
stating “If the plaintiff was represented, his attorney would know that this is
the proper procedure.”
123.
Lynch
blatantly lies in his R&R when states that he has told Mason where got the
legal authority from to issue the orders in question.
124.
Mason
filed objections to this R&R and again pointed to out Lynch and Graham that
they had no absolutely no legal authority to prohibit Mason from communicating
with the government defendants in this matter.
125.
Mason
specifically told the Graham/Lynch duo that they had absolutely no jurisdiction
with respect to the Florida Public Records Act. See Plaintiff’s
Objections To R&R (DE #766) Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint,
hereafter. “objections” filed on or about June 12, 2001.
126.
Koji
and Sorolis knew that the Graham/Lynch duo did not have the legal authority to
prohibit Mason’s communications with the government defendants in this matter
because they [Koji and Sorolis] filed a brief with the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeal and specifically told the 11th Circuit that the
Graham/Lynch duo had no such authority.
See Plaintiff’s Objections To
R&R (DE #766) Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, Page 6.
127.
Lynch
was specifically told by Mason that Koji and Sorolis were making a fool out of
him by telling him [Lynch] that he had the legal authority to prohibit Mason’s
out of court communications with the government defendants in this matter while
simultaneously Koji and Lynch were telling the Eleventh Circuit that the
Graham/Lynch had no such legal authority.
See Objections Page 6.
128.
On
June 20, 2001, Graham issued a two page order adopting the R&R Lynch and
dismissed the plaintiff’s action.
Graham purports to have done a “de novo” review, but his order makes no
recitation to law, not does Graham order address the legal issues raised by
Mason. Graham’s order in merely
conclusory in nature.
COUNT
THIRTEEN (13)- VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1983
129.
MASON
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs three (3)
through five (5), ten (10) thru fourteen (14), and ninety-two (92) thru one
hundred twenty-seven (127) as if fully set forth herein.
130.
Lynch, Graham, Koji and Sorolis’ actions against Mason were in
violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution for rights
protected under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
131.
Graham and Lynch’s actions were willful, illegal, petulant,
childish, irresponsible, and vindictive, and moronic.
132.
Graham and Lynch’s actions represent the highest heights of
stupidity and arrogance.
133.
Graham, Lynch, Sorolis, and Koji knew that a federal judge has
no legal authority to discipline, prohibit, or otherwise terminate Mason’s out
of court communication with the government defendants in the matter at
issue.
134.
Graham, Lynch, Sorolis, and Koji knew full well that Mason’s
First Amendment rights are no less than non-litigants to the action in
question.
135.
Graham, Lynch, Sorolis, and Koji knew full well that the State
Of Florida has never required a person making a public records request under
Florida Law to submit that request to a private, non-government attorney and
law firm.
136.
Graham, Lynch, Sorolis, and Koji knew full well that the
private attorneys of the government have no legal right to be notified prior to
an individual making a public records’ request.
137.
Graham, Lynch, Sorolis, and Koji’ actions bring discredit to
the legal profession.
138.
Graham and Lynch’s behavior are a discredit to the federal
judiciary.
139.
Graham and Lynch’s behavior needlessly and recklessly wastes
the judicial resources of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal.
140.
Graham and Lynch knew full well that they had absolutely no
legal authority to regulate how Mason accesses public records under Florida
Law, nor have they ever cited any.
141.
Graham and Lynch’ actions were designed to bully Mason, a
non-lawyer, into complying with their own illegal and misguided notions about
proper behavior.
142.
Lynch blatantly attempted to undermine Congressional intent as
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636 by issuing a injunction or a temporary restraining
under the guise or cloak of a “pretrial discovery issue and not an injunction.”
143.
Graham and Lynch knew full well that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure does not and can not grant jurisdiction.
144.
Sorolis and Koji knew full well that a federal judge has
absolutely no legal authority to regulate how Mason accesses public records
under Florida Law, nor have they ever cited any.
145.
Graham and Lynch’s behavior was outrageous and they must
taught they can not use their office to bully non-lawyers.
146.
Graham and Lynch are not Mason’s daddy, moreover, Mason is
full-grown intelligent man and has not asked or does not need the personal
approval of his out court behavior by two men bearing robes named Graham and
Lynch.
147.
Graham and Lynch are out of control and need to reined in by
the very law they are sworn to uphold.
148.
Marcellus M. Mason, Jr. simply will not tolerate his rights
being eroded and summarily dismissed by the misinformed duo of
Graham/Lynch.
149.
As a direct and proximate result of Graham, Lynch, Sorolis,
and Koji’s illegal deprivation of Mason’s First Amendment rights, MASON has
suffered extreme mental anguish, outrage, severe anxiety about his future,
embarrassment, damage to his reputation, disruption of his personal life, and
loss of enjoyment of ordinary pleasures of everyday life in the past, and will
continue to suffer these damages in the future.
150.
Wherefore, Plaintiff, Marcellus M. Mason, Jr., demands
judgement against Lynch and Graham in the form of injunctive and declaratory
relief and any other lawful relief. MASON further demands trial by jury.
151.
Wherefore,
Plaintiff, Marcellus M. Mason, Jr.,
demands judgement against Sorolis and Koji for compensatory damages, punitive
damages, interest, costs and such other relief as this court deems
appropriate. MASON further demands
trial by jury.
COUNT
FOURTEEN (14)- VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1985
152.
MASON
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs three (3)
through five (5), ten (10) thru fourteen (14), and ninety-two (92) thru one
hundred twenty-seven (127) as if fully set forth herein.
153.
Lynch,
Graham, Koji and Sorolis’ actions against Mason were in violation of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution for rights protected under 42
U.S.C. §1985.
154.
The
team of Graham, Lynch, Sorolis, and Koji openly conspired to deprive Mason of
his First Amendment rights.
155.
As a direct and proximate result of Graham, Lynch, Sorolis,
and Koji’s illegal deprivation of Mason’s First Amendment rights, MASON has
suffered extreme mental anguish, outrage, severe anxiety about his future,
embarrassment, damage to his reputation, disruption of his personal life, and
loss of enjoyment of ordinary pleasures of everyday life in the past, and will
continue to suffer these damages in the future.
156.
Wherefore, Plaintiff, Marcellus M. Mason, Jr., demands
judgement against Lynch and Graham in the form of injunctive and declaratory
relief and any other lawful relief. MASON further demands trial by jury.
157.
Wherefore,
Plaintiff, Marcellus M. Mason, Jr.,
demands judgement against Sorolis and Koji for compensatory damages, punitive
damages, interest, costs and such other relief as this court deems
appropriate. MASON further demands
trial by jury.
COUNT
FIFTEEN (15)- VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1986
158.
MASON
adopts and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs three (3)
through five (5), ten (10) thru fourteen (14), and ninety-two (92) thru one
hundred twenty-seven (127) as if fully set forth herein.
159.
Lynch,
Graham, Koji and Sorolis’ actions against Mason were in violation of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution for rights protected under 42 U.S.C.
§1986.
160.
The
team of Graham, Lynch, Sorolis, and Koji openly conspired to deprive Mason of
his First Amendment rights.
161.
The
team of Graham, Lynch, Sorolis, and Koji had an affirmative duty to not allow
Mason’s constitutional rights to be summarily dismissed.
RELIEF REQUESTED FOR COUNTS (13), Thirteen, THROUGH (15), Fifteen
162.
As a direct and proximate result of Graham, Lynch, Sorolis,
and Koji’s illegal deprivation of Mason’s First Amendment rights, MASON has
suffered extreme mental anguish, outrage, severe anxiety about his future,
embarrassment, damage to his reputation, disruption of his personal life, and
loss of enjoyment of ordinary pleasures of everyday life in the past, and will
continue to suffer these damages in the future.
163.
Wherefore, Plaintiff, Marcellus M. Mason, Jr., demands
judgement against Lynch and Graham in the form of injunctive and declaratory
relief and any other lawful relief. MASON further demands trial by jury.
164.
Wherefore, Plaintiff, Marcellus M. Mason, Jr., demands
judgement against Sorolis and Koji for compensatory damages, interest, costs
and such other relief as this court deems appropriate. MASON further demands trial by jury.
Dated this 11th
day of January, 2002
BY:
218
Florida Dr.
Sebring,
FL 33870
(941)385-8501
CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true
and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via hand-delivery, on,
January 11, 2002, to: Bob Bullard, Administration Office, Highlands County
Board of County Commissioners, 600 S. Commerce Ave., Sebring, Florida, 33870
DONALD
L. GRAHAM, FRANK LYNCH, JR., BRIAN KOJI, and MARIA SOROLIS are in the process
of being served this complaint via their respective county sheriff’s
office.